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Abstract
This empirical study suggests that, far from ensuring assets are put to their best
use, Chapter 11 encourages entrepreneurs to remain too long with failed busi‐
nesses before trying to start new ones. Small entrepreneurs open and close a
number of businesses over the course of their careers as they search for the busi‐
ness (or employer) that offers the best match with their skills. Chapter 11 delays
this matching process and, over this dimension, differs little from rent control
and other government policies that encourage socially wasteful lock‐in of scarce
resources. These costs may not be large, as bankruptcy judges are aware of and
guard against them. At the same time, however, few benefits offset these costs.
The typical Chapter 11 is a small business that has few, if any, specialized assets.
It is organized around the owner‐operator’s human capital and can be (and usu‐
ally is) reassembled by the owner at low cost. Other than delay, the outcome of a
Chapter 11 case—reorganization or liquidation—has little bearing on a small en‐
trepreneur’s career.

†
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Introduction
This paper offers a comprehensive study of the businesses that made up the
Chapter 11 docket of a large bankruptcy court over the course of a year. This world has
1

not been explored before. The typical Chapter 11 cases are strikingly different from the
Chapter 11 cases one ordinarily hears about. Instead of Uniteds, Enrons, or Kmarts, we
see small businesses with about 20 or fewer employees and assets worth less than
2

$400,000. The characteristics of the typical Chapter 11 match those of small businesses
generally, which account for half of both GDP and non‐government employment in the
3

United States. For these businesses, we show in this paper, the relevant unit of analysis
is the owner and operator of the firm, not the firm itself.

1

The empirical work studying typical Chapter 11 cases to date have been largely me‐
chanical, time‐and‐motion studies of bankruptcy courts, focusing on such questions as the
length of each case and the number that resulted in a successful plan of reorganization. Scant
attention has been paid to the businesses themselves beyond such matters as the number of
creditors and the amount they are owed. Little is known about the nature of the underlying
business beyond what can be gleaned from the crude classification scheme on the bankruptcy
petition itself—one that does not, for example, distinguish an importer of men’s suits from a
restaurant. An exception to the prior literature is Edward R. Morrison, Optimal Timing of Judicial
Decisions in Bankruptcy: An Empirical Study of Shutdown Decisions in Chapter 11, Columbia Law
and Economics Working Paper No. 239 (October 2003), which analyzes economic outcomes in
Chapter 11 cases using data similar to those used here.
2

See Morrison, id. (using 1998 data on Chapter 11 filings in the Northern District of Illi‐
nois, Eastern Division, and finding that 80% of firms had fewer than twenty employees, 75%
had less than $1 million in assets, and about 50% had fewer than $100,000 in assets); Elizabeth
Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 Am.
Bankr. L. J. 499, 529, 548 (1999) (using 1994 data on Chapter 11 filings in 23 districts and finding
that 75% of firms had about 20 employees, 70% had less than $1 million in assets, and 50% had
fewer than $351,000 in assets).
3

Small Business Administration, The Small Business Economy 5 (2004).
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Any given business is merely a spell in the life of an owner‐operator. The owner‐
operator’s human capital is fully portable. These owner‐operators use that human capi‐
tal to start a string of businesses over their lifetimes, moving from business to business
(often in the same industry) until they find a good match between their human capital
4

5

and a particular business model. Much like the process of job shopping by workers,
this process of firm shopping is the process by which a scarce resource (the owner’s

human capital) moves to its most productive use. The owner‐manager’s human capital
is not firm‐specific; it is worth as much inside the firm as it is outside it, which is pre‐
cisely why most entrepreneurs are serial entrepreneurs. Just as taking account of job
6

mobility is a fundamental feature of employment law, serial entrepreneurship should
7

be a central consideration in any discussion of small business bankruptcies.

4

See Thomas J. Holmes and James A. Schmitz, Managerial Tenure, Business Age, and Small
Business Turnover, 14 J. Labor Econ. 79 (1996); Thomas J. Holmes and James A. Schmitz, On the
Turnover of Business Firms and Business Managers, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 1005 (1995).
5

Job‐shopping, unlike firm‐shopping by entrepreneurs, has spawned a vast literature.
Some of the major articles in the area include Robert H. Topel and Michael Ward, Job Mobility
and the Careers of Young Men, 107 Quart. J. Econ. 439 (1992); Boyan Jovanovic, Job Matching and
the Theory of Turnover, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 972 (1979); William Johnson, A Theory of Job Shopping, 92
Quart. J. Econ. 261 (1978).
6

For example, there have been studies of the lock‐in created by employer‐provided
health insurance. Such insurance has unclear welfare implications. See Jonathan Gruber and
Brigitte Madrian, Health Insurance, Labor Supply, and Job Mobility: A Critical Review of the Litera‐
ture, NBER Working Paper No. 8817 (Mar. 2002).
7

The large Chapter 11 cases, while only a tiny fraction of all Chapter 11s, are crucially
different in this respect. A focus on the legal entity makes sense in this context. The business of
WorldCom, United Airlines, and Kmart cannot be meaningfully separated from the corporation
(or, more precisely, corporate group) that files the bankruptcy petition. The corporate entity that
formally enters bankruptcy owns the assets, employs the workers, and contracts with the rest of
the world. Everyone understands, of course, that the boundary between a firm and the rest of
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The delays Chapter 11 brings about are usually justified on grounds that the
judge and the parties need time to “filter” cases in which assets are most valuable inside
8

the firm from those in which the assets have more productive uses elsewhere. Indeed,
generations of scholars have asked whether the potential gains from reorganization jus‐
9

tify the cost of delay. This debate, however, is irrelevant when we are dealing with the
typical Chapter 11 case. There are few assets beyond the entrepreneur’s human capital,
and these rarely have more value inside the business than outside. Hence, it is a mistake
to focus on the question whether the corporate entity that is the subject of the bank‐
ruptcy case is worth saving. When there are no assets other than human capital, Chap‐
10

ter 11 merely creates a bias in owner‐operators to remain with their current business.

the world is permeable and necessarily fuzzy at the edges. Nevertheless, the correspondence
between the business and the corporation is great enough that untangling the affairs of the fi‐
nancially distressed business consists for the most part in sorting out the rights and obligations
of the legal entity that houses it.
8

See, e.g., Michelle J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reor‐
ganizations and Out‐of‐Court Debt Restructurings, 10 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 268 (1994).
9

Some of the many articles in this debate are Timothy C.G. Fisher & Jocelyn Martel, Em‐
pirical Estimates of Filtering Failure in Court‐Supervised Reorganization, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud.
143 (2004); Lawrence A. Weiss and Karen Wruck, Information Problems, Conflicts of Interest, and
Asset‐Stripping: Chapter 11’s Failure in the Case of Eastern Airlines, 48 J. Fin. Econ. 55 (1998); Eliza‐
beth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 Yale L.J. 437 (1992); Michael Bradley
& Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 Yale L. J. 1043 (1992); Douglas G.
Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. Legal. Stud. 127 (1986).
10

Alternative approaches to Chapter 11 do not focus as much on firm‐specific assets and
the going‐concern surplus. Under this approach, any decision about the fate a financially dis‐
tressed corporation should take account of every party with a stake in the business and its fu‐
ture—not only creditors and shareholders, but workers, suppliers, customers, tort victims, and
anyone else the business affects. Bankruptcy’s distributional scheme should not merely respect
the rights of investors, but also ensure that workers, tort victims, and other nonadjusting credi‐
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As conventionally understood, then, Chapter 11 encourages “lock‐in.” We make
it easier for entrepreneurs to resolve their disputes with senior creditors and tax collec‐
tors if, but only if, they keep a particular corporate entity alive. Doing this makes no
more sense than lowering interest rates or taxes for workers provided they stay with
11

their current employer, regardless of whether it suits them. Indeed, the “lock‐in” ef‐
fect of Chapter 11 is qualitatively no different from the lock‐in created by rent control

tors are treated fairly. Powerful creditors should not be able to commandeer the process to ad‐
vance their own interests to the exclusion of others. Bankruptcy judges must retain sufficient
discretion to ensure a collective process that brings everyone to the table. A Chapter 11 corpo‐
rate reorganization is a collective process in which interested parties take stock of the business
and decide on its future.
This approach, as different as it is from the economic approach, begins in the same place
and suffers from the same misconception. Like the economic approach, the traditional approach
links the business with the legal entity that files the Chapter 11 petition. This legal entity is ex‐
actly the wrong place to begin in the typical case. The corporate entity that has filed the petition
is owned and operated by a single individual. The focus should be on this owner‐operator
rather than the legal entity that houses the business. Only by understanding the benefits that
Chapter 11 brings the owner‐operator (and the corresponding costs it imposes on them as well
as others) can we begin to assess the current system and how it works in the typical case.
11

The objection we are making here is radically different from the standard objections to
Chapter 11 in the law and economics literature. Drawing on the tools of corporate finance, some
have argued that Chapter 11 distorts ex ante investments in businesses. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz,
A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 Yale L.J. 1807 (1998). Others have sug‐
gested that, by delaying the shutdown of the business, Chapter 11 puts assets to inefficient use.
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird &Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy,
5l U. Chi. L. Rev. 97 (1984). These critiques rely crucially on the incentives of fully adjusting out‐
side investors and the presence of assets in the business, neither of which is much in evidence in
many small business Chapter 11s. Our critique applies with full force even if the only creditor is
the tax collector and the business has no assets other than the human capital of the small entre‐
preneur. Put differently, we show that the typical Chapter 11 case is best seen through the lens
of labor economics rather than corporate finance.
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(which induces tenants to stay too long in an underpriced apartment)

12

or the taxation

of realized but not unrealized appreciation in the value of an asset (which encourages
13

investors to hold onto appreciating assets). Chapter 11, in short, is a form of rent con‐
trol.
Seen from this perspective, much of the academic thinking about Chapter 11 is
misdirected. Instead of helping small entrepreneurs find the business (or employer) that
best suits them, the focus is upon the corporation that has filed the Chapter 11 petition.
Ensuring that this business survives—housed in this corporate shell with this configura‐
tion of assets—is thought a good thing in itself. But this makes sense only if the business
has value, apart from the skills of the person who runs it. And the typical business in
14

Chapter 11—the drywall contractor or the travel agency—does not, as we will show.

The lock‐in effect, however, does not bring with it large social cost. In fact, these
costs are likely small. First, remarkably few failing businesses enter bankruptcy; the
bankruptcy process is costly, requiring liquidity‐constrained firms to pay thousands of

12

See, e.g., Edward Glaeser & Erzo F.P. Luttmer, The Misallocation of Housing under Rent‐
Control, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 1027 (2003).
13

David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing in Tax Law, 29 J. Legal Stud.

71 (2000).
14

Value might take the form of physical assets (tangible or intangible) whose value
turns on whether the business continues. But, as we show, the typical small business has no
such assets apart from the fully portable human capital of the owner‐operator. Value may also
reside in a network of relationships between the business and third parties, but here again the
relationships belong to the entrepreneur, not the firm, and she takes them with her when the
legal entity dissolves.
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dollars of up‐front legal fees merely to file a petition

15

and consuming over 2% of firm

16

value during the reorganization process . Moreover, for the businesses that do enter
bankruptcy, judges minimize the costs. They can identify and shut down most failing
firms within three months.

17

Finally, even among firms that spend significant time in Chapter 11, the social
costs of the Code’s lock‐in or “rent control” effect are small in a non‐trivial number.
Rent control imposes social costs because it leads to a mismatching of tenants with
18

apartments that are worth more in the hands of others. These costs are low, obviously,

15

Interview with Karen Porter of The Law Offices of Karen J. Porter, Chicago, IL (Oct.
29, 2004) (Ms. Porter and her former firm, Minchella and Porter, represented 6% of the firms in
our study).
16

Id.; see also Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch, & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7
Auctions vs. Chapter 11 Bargaining, Yale ICF Working Paper No. 04‐13 (Mar. 2004) (using com‐
bined data on large and small Chapter 11s filed in Arizona and SDNY during 1995‐01, the au‐
thors found that direct expenses amounted to 9.5% of asset value in the mean firm and 2% in
the median firm).
17

Morrison, supra note 1.

18

Even rent control has its proponents, who argue that it has offsetting social benefits as
a form of welfare policy. Along the same lines, it might be thought that Chapter 11 offers a kind
of “unemployment insurance” for self‐employed workers, who are generally ineligible for gov‐
ernment unemployment insurance benefits. Or it might be thought that Chapter 11 benefits en‐
trepreneurs, their employees, and their customers by creating a short “breathing spell” in which
they can cope with the failure of a business. These potential benefits seem unimportant. Small
business entrepreneurs who work for their own corporations can become eligible for state un‐
employment insurance benefits. See, e.g., Stark v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1960). To the
extent they are ineligible, this reflects a policy judgment. See, e.g., Paul H. Douglas, Social Secu‐
rity in the United States 77‐78 (1936). It would seem odd to advocate Chapter 11 as a means of
undermining that policy choice. And because most small businesses lack asset specificity, they
operate in highly competitive environments where employees and customers of one firm can
identify another firm with similar characteristics.
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in cases in which the tenant would have rented the apartment even without rent con‐
trol. The same is true for Chapter 11: the lock‐in effect is least costly in cases in which
the entrepreneur expects to run precisely the same kind of business even if her current
firm is liquidated in bankruptcy. These cases, as we show, are non‐trivial in number
and typically involve situations where the firm suffered distress as a result of overex‐
pansion (e.g., adding capacity, opening a new outlet in a different neighborhood). Thus,
firms that are allowed to remain in Chapter 11 for a significant period are usually those
in which the serial entrepreneur can find a way to match his or her human capital with
a business within the same corporate shell. These businesses rarely have much in the
way of specialized assets (or indeed assets at all), but, thanks in large part to active judi‐
cial monitoring, the costs of this process are modest and these costs are offset to some
degree through the additional liquidity that some serial entrepreneurs enjoy under ex‐
isting practice.
The modest deadweight losses associated with the current regime, however,
should not minimize the need for reform in academic and political debates about Chap‐
ter 11. We need to move the debate about Chapter 11 and its effects on particular busi‐
nesses to one that focuses squarely on the serial entrepreneur. Chapter 11 should help
(or at least not distort) the efforts of entrepreneurs to find the businesses that best suit
their skills. It can do this best by providing an efficient forum for resolving disputes and
disposing of assets. Current academic thinking about small‐business bankruptcy pushes
in exactly the wrong direction by promoting the business, not the entrepreneur.
Part I describes our methodology and our dataset. Part II shows that small busi‐
nesses in bankruptcy generally lack assets and especially firm‐specific assets. As a re‐
sult, Chapter 11 does little to preserve any ongoing business activity. Part III shows that,
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if Chapter 11 does anything, it deters small entrepreneurs from moving on and finding
better matches between their skills and the businesses they run. This lock‐in effect
drives the typical Chapter 11 and should be the focus of any discussion of bankruptcy
reform or other laws aimed at small business entrepreneurs.

I. The World of Corporate Chapter 11
In this paper, we focus on corporate debtors. We exclude single‐asset real estate
ventures and individuals from the analysis. Both may file Chapter 11 petitions, but each
raises distinct economic issues. Real estate cases typically involve investment vehicles
with a single creditors and no operating business. Individual cases can involve small
entrepreneurs, but the role that Chapter 11 is playing is radically different. By providing
a discharge of personal debt, Chapter 11 facilitates serial entrepreneurship in the case of
19

individuals. As we show, it is doing exactly the opposite in corporate cases. Pooling the
two together would mask the most important feature of Chapter 11 as it applies to each
to corporate and individual debtors respectively.
This paper examines the docket of one bankruptcy court over the course of a sin‐
gle year, the cases filed in the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois
(“Northern District”) during calendar year 1998. The District’s jurisdiction encompasses
Chicago, Cook County, and outlying areas—a large and diverse economy. Relative to
the economy of the country as a whole, there is less agriculture and more manufactur‐
ing, but it is as suitable a place as any to take the pulse of economic activity generally

19

Indeed, Fan and White show that Chapter 7’s fresh start has exactly this effect on en‐
trepreneurs. See Wei Fan and Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of Entrepreneu‐
rial Activity, NBER Working Paper No. 9340 (Nov. 2002).
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and Chapter 11 in particular. Calendar year 1998 is recent enough that the docket is ac‐
cessible electronically, but far enough in the past such that we can see what happened
20

to the business once the Chapter 11 was over.

The Northern District was also chosen because of the rich supply of data. The
21

court’s judges permitted access to a database (PACER) containing copies of every fil‐
ing and judicial order in these cases. We reviewed the docket of each case, including the
bankruptcy petition, the schedules, and any filings (such as disclosure statements) that
discuss the underlying business. These sources give detailed information about each
firm’s finances (assets, debt, cash flow, etc.), history (including events that led to the
bankruptcy petition), experience in bankruptcy (e.g., time in bankruptcy, types of mo‐
tions filed by the debtor and its creditors, types of court orders), and information about
the career history of the owner‐operator.
We augmented this career‐history information using data collected by the Secre‐
tary of State of Illinois and made available on Lexis‐Nexis, such as whether the owner‐
operator in a Chapter 11 case established other businesses, the nature of these busi‐
nesses, and their histories. We then returned to the bankruptcy court files and searched
for any other bankruptcy petitions filed by the same corporation or the principal of the
corporation. We also consulted newspaper stories about the businesses and the people
running them. When necessary, we conducted telephone interviews with the principals

20

This was a time a time of relative economic prosperity, so our data describe the typical
cases that arise in non‐recessionary times. Bankruptcy cases in bad times might, of course, look
different.
21

The database, Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER), is available for a fee
at pacer.uscourts.gov. The Northern District waived the fee for this study.
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of these businesses, those who succeeded them, purchased the business’s assets, or
leased the same premises. When necessary, we also visited the businesses themselves.
The bankruptcy judges on the Northern District are highly respected profession‐
als. Its members in 1998 included prominent members of the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges, the American College of Bankruptcy, and the National Bankruptcy
Conference. One was later appointed to the District Court. There is little danger that the
22

peculiarities or eccentricities of this bench distorted the types of cases filed there. For
these reasons, we believe our sample is representative of small business Chapter 11
cases and, at least in industrial composition, representative of small businesses gener‐
ally.
As Table 1 indicates, the Northern District received 185 Chapter 11 filings during
1998. For this paper, we focus on a subset of these filings: small corporations owned and
23

operated by the same person (the “owner‐operator”). Table 1 also shows that we con‐
solidated eight filings by sister companies (the court consolidated these cases as well)
and eliminated four repeat filings by the same firms and one involuntary petition filed
days before the firm filed its own voluntary petition. Finally, we eliminated two filings
by large, publicly‐traded firms and two filings by moderately sized firms that were not

22

There are two potential distortions worth noting. First, the motions practice of the
Northern District is somewhat different from that of other courts. As one of us has discussed
elsewhere, this motions practice may have the effect of making the court more responsive to
abuses or more likely to dismiss cases early in the process. Second, the I.R.S. is a large presence
in our cases. To the extent that local I.R.S. practices vary (and are known to vary) this too could
affect the population of cases that file in the Northern District.
23

Our dataset includes 22 real estate cases and 42 filings by flesh‐and‐blood individuals.
For the reasons noted above, we are not focusing on them in this paper.
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Table 1
Sample Selection
Initial sample
Deletions or consolidations:
Individual debtor cases
Single asset real estate cases
Sister companies
Repeat filings
Large, publicly‐traded firms
Firms without owner‐managers
Simultaneous involuntary petitions
Final sample

Petitions
185
(42)
(22)
(8)
(4)
(2)
(2)
(1)
104

owner‐managed. The Small Business Administration defines a “small business” as one
with less than 500 employees. Each of the publicly‐traded firms had over 700 employ‐
ees. The two moderately‐sized firms had fewer than 500 employees but were different
from the other businesses in this study because they exhibited the classic separation of
ownership and control associated with large corporations. It should be noted, however,
that the results shown below are unaffected by the exclusion of these moderately‐sized
firms. After making these exclusions and consolidations, our sample of Chapter 11 fil‐
ings falls from 185 to 104 observations.
The cases in our sample are, to the extent we can tell, similar to Chapter 11 cases
filed elsewhere in terms of the amount of the debt, the amount of assets, and other char‐
24

acteristics reported in other studies. Indeed, the businesses themselves look much like

24

See Morrison, supra note 1, who can offer only a tentative conclusion regarding the
comparability of the cases in our sample to cases filed in other bankruptcy courts. The classifica‐
tions on the bankruptcy petition itself are crude and, as other scholars typically have not gone
beyond them, he could compare our cases with others using only this metric. Nevertheless,
wherever others have gone beyond the face of the petition, their findings are consistent with
ours. For example, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook supplemented data from the petitions and
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businesses as a whole in the economy. Tables 2 and 3 compare the characteristics of
firms in our sample to those of corporations in a representative national sample of small
businesses, the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF), administered by the Fed‐
25

eral Reserve Board . The industry composition of firms in our sample differs from dis‐
tribution of SSBF corporations in a few respects. Wholesale Trade is underrepresented
in our sample; Eating and Drinking Places and Business Services are overrepresented.
The percentage of firms with fewer than 20 employees is about the same, around 80
percent, in both samples. Relative to SSBF businesses, however, the ones in our sample
are markedly younger: the median age is 6.8 years, relative to 13 years in the SSBF. And,
not surprisingly, the firms in our sample have fewer assets, more debt, and much more
leverage than the average businesses in the SSBF. In short, the distressed businesses in
our sample are somewhat smaller, younger, and more concentrated in the eating and

schedules with telephone interviews and their findings are consistent with our finding that the
principals of Chapter 11 corporate debtors are serial entrepreneurs. See Teresa A. Sullivan,
Elizabeth Warren, & Jay Westbrook, Financial Difficulties of Small Businesses and Reasons for their
Failure, Working Paper SBA‐95‐0403 (1998). This study, however, looked at debtors in Chapters
7, 11, and 13 and does not distinguish corporate debtors from individuals. Some of the debtors
whom they found to have started new businesses likely were associated with corporations that
had filed Chapter 11 petitions, but there is no way to know how many. Again, one can draw
only limited inferences from a dataset that combines the two different kinds of cases, especially
with respect to an issue where, depending on the debtor is an individual or a corporation, the
Bankruptcy Code pushes in opposite directions.
25

For more information about this survey, see Marianne P. Bitler, Alicia M. Robb, &
John D. Wolken, Financial Services Used by Small Businesses: Evidence from the 1998 Survey of Small
Business Finances, 87 Federal Reserve Bulletin 183 (April 2001).
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Industry (SIC No.)
Construction (15‐17)
Manufacturing (20‐39)
Transportation (40‐48)
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50‐51)
Retail Trade (52‐59)
Eating and Drinking Places (58)
Insurance and finance (60‐69)
Business Services (47‐49, 70‐79)
Professional Services (80‐89)
TOTAL

Table 2
Sample Statistics, Corporate Chapter 11 Filings in N.D. IL during 1998
Under 20
Age in years
Asset Value, $
Employees,
median
median
% (freq)
% (sd)
(mean) (sd)
(mean) (sd)
13.5 (14)
76.9
7.0 (12.5)
467,201
(1,236,721)
11.5 (12)
91.7
28.4 (31.6)
405,163
(1,541,870)
3.9 (4)
100.0
4.5 (5.3)
103,350
(103,350)
2.9 (3)
100.0
10.1 (8.4)
24,826
(176,217)
13.5 (14)
71.4
6.5 (11.5)
221,116
(950,756)
18.3 (19)
71.4
3.5 (11.7)
56,172
(204,455)
2.9 (3)
100.0
13.1 (12.5)
26,652
(24,332)
17.3 (18)
81.3
7.3 (9.9)
149,225
(686,330)
16.4 (17)
85.7
6.8 (9.8)
130,970
(367,101)
100.0 (104)
81.5 (39.02)
6.8 (13.1) (16.11)
148,090
(715,532)
(1,539,281)
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Debt, $
median
(mean) (sd)
823,977
(2,797,048)
1,130,172
(11,300,000)
253,512
(378,912)
1,210,366
(1,022,860)
1,230,304
(2,425,506)
272,882
(705,415)
341,012
(1,521,263)
515,238
(828,243)
382,518
(800,685)
550,048
(2,513,199)
(10,700,000)

Leverage, %
median
(mean) (sd)
2.8 (4.6)
3.3 (5.7)
1.8 (1.8)
7.3 (29.1)
3.1 (6.3)
5.2 (6.1)
20.1 (44.5)
2.4 (12.4)
2.6 (46.4)
3.3 (15.7)
(65.02)

Table 3
Summary Statistics, Corporations in 1998 SSBF (excluding mining and real estate)
Under 20
Age in years
Asset Value, $
Debt, $
Leverage
Industry (SIC No.)
Employees
median
median
median
median
% (freq)
% (se)
(mean) (se)
(mean) (se)
(mean) (se)
(mean) (se)
Construction (15‐17)
11.2 (187)
80.6 (2.79)
14 (14.6)
520,706
317,040
.74 (.72)
(.94)
(756,062) (131,399)
(544,899) (109,672)
(.059)
Manufacturing (20‐39)
11.7 (287)
71.1 (3.07)
15 (14.6)
1,682,902
796,000
.59 (.57)
(.83)
(1,499,328) (170,572)
(854,470) (99,758)
(.032)
Transportation (40‐48)
3.3 (74)
75.2 (5.30)
11.5 (10.5)
834,219
673,488
.73 (.70)
(1.59)
(953,939) (228,740)
(668,717) (146,548)
(.094)
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50‐51)
11.3 (179)
84.4 (2.45)
14 (14.7)
795,000
400,000
54 (.64)
(1.38)
(1,149,670) (151,521)
(732,278) (125,948)
(.080)
Retail Trade (52‐59)
15.2 (263)
84.0 (2.11)
15 (14.7)
360,000
203,000
.64 (.62)
(.91)
(764,249) (97,563)
(474,712) (66,630)
(.069)
Eating and Drinking Places (58)
3.6 (102)
59.2 (6.05)
14.5 (13.2)
254,667
138,875
.61 (.56)
(1.10)
(306,869) (53,990)
(172,569) (28,709)
(.084)
Insurance and finance (60‐69)
2.7 (35)
91.5 (3.59)
13 (17.4)
116,880
121,000
.70 (1.55)
(2.28)
(368,816) (92,524)
(570,641) (226,090)
(.663)
Business Services (47‐49, 70‐79)
23.9 (372)
90.3 (1.31)
10 (11.9)
141,273
71,891
.55 (.70)
(.56)
(376,597) (65,905)
(262,987) (64,171)
(.173)
Professional Services (80‐89)
17.1 (305)
86.2 (1.83)
12 (13.4)
123,214
64,849
.55 (.62)
(.75)
(373,878) (87,058)
(231,567) (52,637)
(.119)
TOTAL
100.0 (1804)
83.1 (0.56)
13.0 (13.7)
320,971
191,660
.59 (.65)
(.323)
(713,023) (36,472)
(462,848) (29,056)
(.034)
Note: reported means are estimates of population averages (with associated standard errors) and were computed using survey weights. Reported
medians are simply the 50th percentile of the raw, unweighted data.
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26

drinking and services sectors. Similar patterns characterize corporate Chapter 7 filings
27

in the Northern District.

If we look closely at the experience of these firms in bankruptcy, some important
patterns emerge. Table 4 shows that the majority of these firms (62.5%) will be shut
down in bankruptcy or will have their petitions dismissed and thereby be exposed to
liquidation under state law. In other words, in over sixty percent of the cases, Chapter
11 “fails” in the sense that the distressed business leaves Chapter 11 with its problems
unresolved. In another eight cases (7.7%) percent of the cases, the firm is sold off as a
going concern. In still another eight cases, the debtor achieves solves the problems that
brought it into bankruptcy (such as a threat of eviction by the landlord) without going
through the process of confirming a formal plan of reorganization (such as reaching a
side deal with the landlord). In only 23 of 104 (22.1%) of the cases do we see something
resembling a traditional reorganization, and only 14 of these remain in business, as Ta‐
ble 5 shows. In the others, the reorganized firm subsequently failed and either filed an‐
other bankruptcy petition or was liquidated under state law. Failure typically occurred
within two and a half years of reorganization.

26

That eating and drinking establishments are overrepresented in bankruptcy squares
with anecdotal evidence, but again one must caution against generalizing. Other empirical stud‐
ies of Chapter 11 do not look at the underlying businesses enough even to know how many are
eating and drinking establishments.
27

We confirmed this by randomly sampling 100 of the more than 300 corporate Chapter
7 filings from the Northern District in 1998. They matched the Chapter 11 cases in debts, assets,
age, number of employees, and other characteristics. In observing this, however, we are not
claiming that they are identical. The Chapter 7 cases, for example, included twice as many con‐
struction firms and half as many restaurants. Again, different forces are at work.
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Industry (SIC No.)
Construction (15‐17)
Manufacturing (20‐39)
Transportation (40‐48)
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50‐51)
Retail Trade (52‐59)
Eating and Drinking Places (58)
Insurance Agents (60‐69)
Business Services (47‐49, 70‐79)
Professional Services (80‐89)
TOTAL

Table 4
Bankruptcy Outcomes, by Industrial Classification
% reorganized
% restructured
Frequency
(sd)
without plan (sd)
14
21.4
0.0
12
25.0
16.67
4
0.0
25.0
3
33.3
0.0
14
28.6
14.3
19
21.5
5.3
3
0.0
0.0
18
27.8
0.0
17
17.7
11.8
104
22.1
7.7
(41.70)
(26.78)

Industrial (SIC No.)
Construction (15‐17)
Manufacturing (20‐39)
Transportation (40‐48)
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50‐51)
Retail Trade (52‐59)
Eating and Drinking Places (58)
Insurance Agents (60‐69)
Business Services (47‐49, 70‐79)
Professional Services (80‐89)
TOTAL
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Table 5
Outcomes of Reorganizations
Firm failed after reorganizing
(frequency) (n)
(%) (sd)
1 (3)
1 (3)
.
0 (1)
1 (4)
1 (4)
.
2 (5)
3 (3)
9 (23)
(39.1) (49.90)

% sold off
(sd)
0.0
25.0
0.0
0.0
14.3
10.5
0.0
5.6
0.0
7.7
(26.78)

% shut down or
dismissed (sd)
78.6
33.3
75.0
66.7
42.9
63.2
100.0
66.7
70.6
62.5
(48.65)

Mean years until failure
after reorganizing
(sd)
.9
4.5
.
.
1.8
2.5
.
2.5
2.2
2.5
(1.54)

Do these different legal outcomes matter? Does the success or failure of Chapter
11 affect the economic productivity of the firm? These are generally thought to be easy
questions with an obvious answer—namely, that a firm will die and its productivity
disappear if its Chapter 11 filing is unsuccessful. These questions, however, are not so
easy. To be sure, a few Chapter 11 filings involve corporations in which a focus on the
corporate entity makes sense. There are businesses that exist independently of whoever
happens to own it, and they are qualitatively similar to the large Chapter 11 cases that
make the headlines. A restaurant/microbrewery is sold as a going concern, as is a chain
of Mrs. Field’s cookie franchises and a hotel. A manufacturer of furnace linings sorts out
its asbestos liabilities in Chapter 11. But these firms—like Chapter 11 filings involving
large corporations—are rare.
Much more common are firms that are organized around the skills of the owner‐
manager. The business and its owner‐operator are one and the same. The business may
be a livery service, a small trucking business, or a travel or insurance agency. In each
case, it is impossible to separate the business from the person running it. As a result,
any effort to sort out the rights and obligations of the corporation in bankruptcy has
only a tangential effect on the business itself. These businesses consist of relationships,
not assets, and the relationships belong to the individual not the corporation. If you
were happy with the work performed last year and wanted to use the same people
again, you would be indifferent to the existence of the corporation. You might reengage
this entrepreneur without ever knowing (or caring) that the corporate form she is using
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28

this year was the different from the one she used last year.

Thus, for such businesses,

the Chapter 11 of the corporation has virtually no effect on the future of the business.
Although bankruptcy scholars have largely ignored this fundamental character‐
istic of small business owners, empirical economists have not. They have shown that
owner‐operators have a taste for running their own business. These small entrepreneurs
start their businesses and continue to run them even though they would make more
29

elsewhere, and even though owning such a business requires tying up much of their
30

wealth (typically about half ) in the business. Small‐business entrepreneurs appear to
have a taste for self‐employment. Indeed, the strongest predictor of whether an indi‐
vidual will open a business is whether his or her parents did. It is not a question of chil‐
dren being brought into the family business. Most of those who run their own business
31

run a business different from that of their parents. A parent’s self‐employment experi‐
ence has a large and statistically significant effect on a son’s likelihood of becoming self

28

The customer is indifferent because the corporate form does little more than partition
assets. In the first instance, the corporation partitions assets. The creditors of the corporation
cannot reach the home or the personal bank account of the entrepreneur. On the other hand,
these same creditors know that if the corporation has an account receivable, they will be able to
reach it before either the entrepreneur or her own creditors. See Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman, The Central Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387 (2000).
29

Barton H. Hamilton, Does Entrepreneurship Pay? An Empirical Analysis of the Returns to
Self‐Employment, 108 J. Pol. Econ. 604 (2000).
30

William M. Gentry and R. Glenn Hubbard, Entrepreneurship and Household Saving at
25, NBER Working Paper No. 7894 (Sep. 2000).
31

Dunn and Holtz‐Eakin estimate that at most 36% of second‐generation self‐employed
sons would be classified as entering a family business. Thomas Dunn & Douglas Holtz‐Eakin,
Financial Capital, Human Capital, and the Transition to Self‐Employment: Evidence from Intergenera‐
tional Links, 18 J. Labor Econ. 282 (2000).
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employed, even after controlling for parental wealth and the son’s wealth (and other
32

covariates).

A striking characteristic of small businesses is the rate at which they fail. Many
small businesses fail each year. Indeed, between 20 and 30 percent of new startups close
33

within their first year; nearly 80 percent close within six years.

The failure of the busi‐

ness, however, does not mean that the person who ran it returns to work for someone
else never to try again. Although some are not cut out to be entrepreneurs and they re‐
turn to working for someone else, many are serial entrepreneurs. The founders of one
third of all small businesses have started other businesses in the past.

34

Indeed starting

a business, then closing it, and beginning another is no more a failure than accepting
one job, leaving, and going to another. There is an optimal amount of time to spend at
one job before looking for another. The same is true for these owner‐operators. Al‐

32

Id., at 296‐99 A son’s probability of becoming self employed rises .015 (relative to an
average probability of becoming self employed equal to .031) when his parents are self‐
employed. In other words, a father’s self‐employment experience increases the son’s probability
of becoming self‐employed by about 50%. The phenomenon is also independent of wealth. Self‐
employed parents are significantly more wealthy (three times more wealthy) than non‐self‐
employed parents, and greater parental wealth increases the probability that a son will become
self‐employed. But the effect is modest. A $10,000 increase in parental assets raises the probabil‐
ity of a son’s annual transition to self‐employment by .0009. Given that the annual probability of
transition is .031, this is a very small effect.
33

Marc J. Dollinger, Entrepreneurship: Strategies and Resources (Prentice Hall 2003).

34

This figure is derived by Sarasvathy and Menon in their review of the entrepreneur‐
ship literature. See Sara D. Sarasvathy and Anil Menon, Failing Firms and Successful Entrepre‐
neurs: Serial Entrepreneurship as a Temporal Portfolio, Darden Business School Working Paper No.
04‐05 (March 2003). Their finding is consistent with raw data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s
1992 survey of the Characteristics of Business Owners (CBO), which indicates that about 35% of
business owners previously owned another business. See census.gov/ csd/cbo/1992/www/
cbo9201.htm.
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35

though patterns vary across industries,

one basic pattern emerges. The longer you are
36

business for yourself, the less likely you are to return to working for someone else.

This phenomenon—serial entrepreneurship—is a striking characteristic of the entrepre‐
neurs in our sample. They are overwhelmingly committed to self‐employment. Al‐
though they are not committed to any particular business, they are committed into be‐
ing in business for themselves.
Before we focus upon serial entrepreneurship explicitly, however, we look more
closely at the businesses and the assets that are owned by the corporations in our study.
The close connection between the principal and the business is possible to reconcile
with the traditional economic account of Chapter 11 if there is synergy among the assets
or between the assets and the distinct skills of the owner‐operator of the business.
Whether such synergy exists is the focus of the next part of the paper.

35

Most obviously, start‐up costs vary by industry. Manufacturing, wholesaling, and re‐
tailing have the highest average startup capitalization costs. Professional services, finance, in‐
surance, real estate, and business services are skill‐intensive and have relatively low start‐up
costs. In the construction industry, those who run their own businesses at one time regu‐

larly switch to working for someone else and then back to working for themselves
again, depending upon the economy and the work that is available. Timothy Bates,
Analysis of Young Small Firms that have Closed: Delineating Successful from Unsuccessful Closures,
Bureau of the Census, Center for Economic Studies Working Paper No. CES‐WP‐02‐24, Bureau of
the Census (Oct. 2002).
36

Indeed, using 1966‐81 data from the National Longitudinal Study of Young Men, Ev‐
ans and Leighton found that the probability of exiting self‐employment falls essentially to zero
after 11 years. David S. Evans & Linda S. Leighton, Some Empirical Aspects of Entrepreneurship, 79
Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 525 (1989).

Baird & Morrison—Page 20

II. Asset‐Specificity and Going‐Concern Value
If the assets of a small business are worth more in the hands of the current owner
than anywhere else and if Chapter 11 can help ensure that they stay together, then we
can justify Chapter 11 on the ground that it preserves going‐concern value. Chapter 11
could be justified on the ground that specialized assets need to be kept together and the
entrepreneur’s human capital is put to its best use if it remains with this business. To
the extent that the assets of a distressed firm are specialized and more valuable inside
the firm than outside it, encouraging entrepreneurs to remain with an existing business
might be a good idea. Chapter 11 might prevent the dispersal of a firm’s assets when
the best use of those assets is within the firm itself. We show, however, that the typical,
distressed small business in Chapter 11 has little in the way of firm‐specific capital of
any value.
In the first section, we analyze the raw data for all of the firms in our sample and
offer two different tests of asset specificity. Both point to its absence in all cases but one,
restaurants. The next section illustrates this point with a case study of a typical non‐
restaurant establishment. The concluding section looks at to restaurants, the only type
of case where asset specificity is potentially important.
A. Two empirical tests of asset specificity
A policy directed towards saving businesses makes sense only if social value is
lost when a firm dies. Social value is lost if the firm’s assets generate greater value in
their current configuration than in a market sale. This difference—the “going‐concern
surplus”—exists only if the firm’s assets are worth more inside the business than any‐
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where else. Assets are worth more inside than outside a business when assets are cus‐
tomized to meet a business’s idiosyncratic needs or the needs of businesses in the same
industry (examples include railroad tracks and brewery equipment). These specialized
assets cannot be readily redeployed by other businesses (if the assets are firm‐specific)
or by firms outside the industry (if they are industry‐specific). As a result, plant, equip‐
ment, and other specialized assets are relatively illiquid. There are few buyers for the as‐
sets, and any potential buyers will value the assets significantly less than the seller
38

does. A basic function of bankruptcy law is to protect these illiquid assets and give the
business that is using them an opportunity to continue using them. If creditors could
seize and sell these assets, they would fetch “fire sale” prices and the firm’s going‐
concern surplus might be destroyed.

39

It might be possible to resurrect the firm by reac‐

quiring or recreating its specialized assets, but this is very costly. Indeed, the liquidation

37

For similar arguments, see Viral V. Acharya, Rangarajan K. Sundaram, & Kose A.
John, On the Capital‐Structure Implications of Bankruptcy Codes, working paper (March 28, 2004);
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmusssen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 673, 685‐93
(2003); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmusssen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751,
768‐777 (2002).
38

See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 J. Fin. 567 (1998),
showing the link between asset specificity and corporate finance.
39

Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equi‐
librium Approach, 47 J. Fin. 1343 (1992), develop this point. They show that when financial dis‐
tress is correlated within an industry, bankruptcy law prevents inefficient liquidation of indus‐
try‐specific assets. In the absence of bankruptcy law, these assets would be sold at fire‐sale
prices to lower‐value users outside the industry; the assets will not be purchased by higher‐
valuing users within the same industry because they too are suffering distress and are therefore
liquidity constrained. For empirical evidence supporting this theory, see Per Strömberg, Con‐
flicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests, 55 J. Fin. 2641
(2000); Todd C. Pulvino, Do Asset Fire Sales Exist? An Empirical Investigation of Commercial Air‐
craft Sale Transactions, 53 J. Fin. 939 (1998).
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of a corporation is often viewed as an irreversible event, or at least one that is signifi‐
40

cantly costly to reverse.

Asset‐specificity, then, is central to an efficiency‐based theory of Chapter 11. In
the absence of firm‐ or industry‐specific assets, a firm is not worth reorganizing. Be‐
cause an outsider values the assets at least as much as the firm does, no value is lost if
the firm is liquidated. Indeed, value will be saved by avoiding the direct and indirect
costs of Chapter 11.

41

Even a casual glance at the data suggests that in most cases the answer to this
question is negative. The bulk of small businesses in bankruptcy—the contractors, the
livery services, the retailers—are organized around the skills of the owner‐operator. The
physical capital of these firms consists of generic tools and equipment. The only signifi‐
cant asset is the human capital of the manager, which can be readily deployed in differ‐
ent businesses. The photographer, electrician, lawyer, and restaurateur can shut down
one operation and open another and be just as productive. Put differently, a glance at
the data suggests that most small businesses have no specialized assets other than the
human capital of the owner‐operator. But this human capital is not specialized in the
traditional sense that it has more value inside the firm than outside it. Human capital is
specialized (and therefore illiquid) because it can be used by only one owner. It is spe‐

40

White, supra note 8, at 273, discusses this view. See also Shleifer & Vishny, supra note

39.
41

For recent work on these costs, see Bris, Welch, & Zhu, supra. Again, we are focusing
on the typical bankruptcy case, not the handful of cases involving tens of millions or more in
assets. One can argue that asset‐specificity does not matter here either. See, e.g., Douglas G.
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751 (2002). But that is not
our focus here.
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cialized to the owner‐operator, not to the firm, and it can be equally productive in many
firms. These impressions find solid support in the data.
1.

A direct test of asset specificity

We propose two tests for the presence and importance of firm or—industry‐
specific assets—a direct test and an indirect one. A direct test measures the extent to
which a firm’s assets are invested in assets, such as plant and equipment, which are
relatively illiquid. The value of plant and equipment (and perhaps other specialized as‐
sets) is divided by total assets to form an index of asset specificity. The larger this index,
the greater the importance of specialized assets in a given firm. To be sure, this index is
somewhat crude because it does not account for the possibility that some assets (e.g.,
office furniture) may be specialized in some firms but not in others. For this reason, we
offer an alternative indirect test in the next subsection. Nonetheless, we think the direct
test offered here is illuminating, particularly because we obtain fairly strong results.
42

Additionally, this test is well‐accepted in the corporate finance literature.

Tables 6 through 9 present the results of this direct test. Tables 6 and 8 present
various indices of asset specificity for the median and mean firm. A generous definition
of specialized assets would include land (real estate used for a gas station, for example,
is costly to use for other purposes) and equipment. Using this definition, about 29% of
the median firm’s assets and about 41% of the mean firm’s assets are “specialized.” This

42

See, e.g., Per Strömberg, supra note 39; Phillip G. Berger, Eli Ofek, & Itzhak Swary, In‐
vestor Valuation of the Abandonment Option, 42 J. Fin. Econ. 257 (1996).
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Table 6
Measures of Asset Specificity for Median Firm, Corporate Chapter 11 Filings
Land & equipment
Equipment
Non‐office equipment,
Industry (SIC No.)
(% of assets)
(% of assets)
(% of assets)
Construction (15‐17)
12.1
10.0
7.8
Manufacturing (20‐39)
16.1
8.2
4.9
Transportation (40‐46)
1.1
1.1
0.0
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50‐51)
3.1
3.1
0.0
Retail Trade (52‐59)
16.3
13.7
1.3
Eating and Drinking Places (58)
62.0
57.4
50.9
Insurance Agents (60‐64)
22.1
22.1
0.0
Business Services (47, 4959, 70‐79)
78.7
59.5
6.9
Professional Services (80‐89)
16.2
7.6
0.0
ALL FIRMS
28.9
16.5
5.5
ALL FIRMS EXCEPT EATING/DRINKING
17.1
10.6
2.2

Table 7
Asset Specificity of Median Firm, 1998 SSBF Data for Corporations (unweighted)
Land & equipment
Equipment
Industry (SIC No.)
(% of assets)
(% of assets)
Construction (15‐17)
18.9
17.0
Manufacturing (20‐39)
29.9
29.6
Transportation (40‐46, 48‐49)
41.5
38.3
Wholesale Trade (50‐51)
11.0
9.8
Retail Trade (52‐57, 59)
13.7
11.8
Eating and Drinking Places (58)
65.4
47.7
Insurance Agents (60‐64)
18.2
18.2
Business Services (47, 70‐79)
24.8
21.0
Professional Services (80‐89)
21.1
10.9
TOTAL
21.8
19.0
TOTAL WITHOUT EATING/DRINKING
20.2
17.9
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Table 8
Measures of Asset Specificity for Mean Firm, Corporate Chapter 11 Filings
Land & equipment
Equipment
Industry (SIC No.)
(% of assets) (sd)
(% of assets) (sd)
Construction (15‐17)
21.4 (28.08)
19.7 (28.51)
Manufacturing (20‐39)
33.6 (39.48)
25.2 (35.10)
Transportation (40‐46)
1.1 (1.51)
1.1 (1.51)
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50‐51)
3.7 (4.07)
3.7 (4.07)
Retail Trade (52‐59)
25.9 (27.10)
18.7 (16.95)
Eating and Drinking Places (58)
61.3 (27.12)
55.8 (28.94)
Insurance Agents (60‐64)
18.3 (11.98)
18.3 (11.98)
Business Services (47, 4959, 70‐79)
65.7 (34.91)
54.2 (38.10)
Professional Services (80‐89)
40.9 (40.85)
20.1 (30.74)
ALL FIRMS
40.6 (36.45)
31.9 (33.60)
ALL FIRMS EXCEPT EATING/DRINKING
35.8 (36.79)
26.4 (32.31)

Non‐office equipment,
(% of assets) (sd)
15.7 (25.35)
22.1 (30.12)
0.0 (0.00)
0.6 (1.16)
9.4 (14.17)
53.9 (28.26)
3.1 (5.37)
34.4 (39.87)
5.1 (14.75)
22.9 (31.04)
15.8 (27.16)

Table 9
Asset Specificity of Mean Firm, 1998 SSBF Data for Corporations (weighted)
Land & equipment
Equipment
Industry (SIC No.)
(% of assets) (sd)
(% of assets) (sd)
Construction (15‐17)
28.2 (26.49)
25.0 (25.11)
Manufacturing (20‐39)
34.2 (26.46)
32.8 (25.75)
Transportation (40‐46, 48‐49)
41.1 (34.38)
39.4 (33.94)
Wholesale Trade (50‐51)
17.9 (21.48)
15.6 (18.65)
Retail Trade (52‐57, 59)
23.1 (24.38)
19.4 (20.95)
Eating and Drinking Places (58)
57.6 (33.59)
47.2 (31.37)
Insurance Agents (60‐64)
27.0 (30.19)
25.6 (29.35)
Business Services (47, 70‐79)
34.3 (32.96)
30.6 (30.26)
Professional Services (80‐89)
31.0 (31.02)
28.7 (29.07)
TOTAL
31.25 (30.07)
28.1 (27.84)
TOTAL WITHOUT EATING/DRINKING
29.7 (29.11)
26.9 (27.20)
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definition is overbroad. Land is rarely specialized; indeed, economists typically lump
real estate together with other non‐specialized assets such as cash. Additionally, much
of the “equipment” of a small business consists of computers, chairs, desks, and other
office equipment, none of which is specialized in any meaningful sense. The columns in
Tables 6 and 8 show the effect of excluding these assets from the definition of “special‐
ized” assets. Excluding land, the percentage drops to 16.5% for the median firm and to
31.9% for the mean firm. These are low percentages. The estimate for the median firm,
for example, is about half the size of the estimate (32%) obtained by Berger, Ofek, and
43

Swary in their study of publicly‐traded firms. The estimates of asset specificity in our
sample drop even further when exclude office equipment. For the median firm, the per‐
centage drops to 5.5%; for the mean firm it falls to 22.9%.
We believe that the final estimates—that 5.5% of assets are possibly firm‐specific
in the median firm and 22.9% in the mean firm—are the most plausible estimates of the
importance of asset specificity. But even these numbers are upper bounds for the vast ma‐
jority of firms because the means are heavily influenced by the presence of establish‐
ments in the eating and drinking (in which 51% of the assets of the median firm consist
of non‐office equipment), construction (7.8%), and business services (6.9%) sectors. Ex‐
clude eating and drinking and the estimates fall to 2.2% for the median firm and 15.8%
for the mean firm. If we also exclude construction and business services, the figures fall
to 0.1% and 9.8%, respectively.

43

Berger, Ofek & Swary, supra note 42, at 269. The actual percentage is 31.7%, which can
be derived from the author’s Table 1, which reports that “fixed assets” (plant, equipment, and
land) account for 33.6% of assets in the median firm and that land accounts for 5.2% of “fixed
assets.”

Baird & Morrison—Page 27

Eating and drinking establishments may indeed have significant specialized as‐
sets, but we doubt the same is true for construction and business services. The estimates
for these two sectors undoubtedly overstate the extent of firm‐specific capital in excava‐
tors, drywallers, photographers, graphic designers, and similar establishments. The
non‐office equipment of the typical construction firm consists of forklifts, hammers, ex‐
cavation equipment, and other tools. Not only do these tools have thick resale markets,
but many firms lease this equipment from third parties. If an otherwise healthy busi‐
ness lost this equipment through theft or fire, it could buy or lease the equipment and
continue operations, perhaps without even a break in operations. The same is true for
business services. Consider, for example, Advanced Photo & Video Imaging. This
photo‐processing shop claimed $45,000 worth of photo‐developing equipment (cam‐
eras, flash meters, film processors, computers), which accounted for 92% of its assets.
Among business services, Advanced Photo had the highest ratio of non‐office equip‐
ment to total assets. Yet this equipment was hardly specialized. Indeed, it represented
only about half of the photo‐developing equipment used at the firm. The remaining
equipment was leased, a hallmark of low asset specificity. Advanced Photo & Video
Imaging is a typical case; if we looked closely at each firm with a high fraction of assets
invested in equipment, we would find fungible, standardized assets.
Our estimates of asset specificity, then, are biased upward by the presence of a
few firms (such as Advanced Photo & Video) with high ratios of standardized non‐
office equipment to total assets. This bias has its largest effect on our estimates for the
mean firm; averages are sensitive to outliers. For this reason, the estimates for the me‐
dian firm—which are less vulnerable to outliers—are the most reliable estimates of the
significance of asset specificity in all firms except restaurants. This implies that the typi‐
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cal firm has at most 2.2% of its assets invested in potentially specialized equipment. In
other words, the typical small business has a small, perhaps trivial, investment in assets
that are potentially specialized. Only restaurants present something of a special case,
and, as we shall see, the case for valuable firm‐specific assets is hard to make even
there.
Interestingly, the picture is not much different when we look at healthier busi‐
nesses in the SSBF sample. As Table 7 shows, about 22% of the median firm’s assets
consist of land and equipment, which is slightly lower than the 29% figure in our sam‐
ple. The difference narrows substantially if we exclude restaurants: the median firm in
the general population has about 20% of its assets invested in land and equipment; the
figure is about 17% in our sample. Similarly, equipment makes up 17.9% of the median
SSBF firm’s assets (excluding restaurants); the figure for firms in our population is
about 11%. Unfortunately, SSBF data do not allow us to distinguish between office
equipment and non‐office equipment. These results, however, suggest that the low lev‐
els of asset specificity observed in our data are not unique to distressed small businesses.
2.

An indirect test of asset specificity

Tables 6 through 9 present a direct test of asset specificity that distinguishes be‐
tween assets with highly liquid markets (cash) and those with less liquid markets (ma‐
chinery). It does not identify firms with assets that are sufficiently illiquid that they
would generate “fire sale” prices. Although scholars have identified particular assets
(e.g., railroad tracks) that are illiquid to this degree, there are no well‐accepted criteria
for distinguishing illiquid assets generally.
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The limitations of the direct test suggest that we look for an alternative test of the
presence of firm‐ or industry‐specific assets. One such test, we believe, is whether liqui‐
dation of a small business is an irreversible event. If a firm’s going‐concern value de‐
pends on specialized assets that are hard to recreate or reacquire, liquidation should be
irreversible or very costly to reverse. We implement this test—which is indirect because
it assesses the consequences of asset specificity—by looking at the career histories of the
owner‐operators of firms that filed Chapter 11 petitions. If owner‐operators are able to
establish new, similar businesses soon after their firms are liquidated in Chapter 11, we
infer that firm‐specific assets are relatively unimportant or easy to reacquire (in either
case, there is little support for the efficiency‐based theory of Chapter 11). Similarly, if
the firm in bankruptcy is one of many similar businesses established in the past by the
owner‐operator, we also infer that asset specificity is unimportant. We must also con‐
sider the possibility that the owner‐operator will start a different kind of business after
his or her firm is liquidated in Chapter 11 (and the possibility that he or she established
different businesses in the past). Indeed, the literature on small business entrepreneurs
indicates that they may move between different kinds of businesses as they search for
an optimal “match.”
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If we see this kind of “firm shopping,” we can at least conclude

that the owner‐operator’s human capital is not firm‐specific. If human capital is the
principal asset in most small businesses, this conclusion is significant and suggests that
firm‐specific assets are unimportant.
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See, e.g., Holmes and Schmitz, Managerial Tenure, supra note 4; Holmes and Schmitz,
On the Turnover of Business Firms, supra note 4.
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Tables 10 through 13 report the results of this indirect test. Table 10 shows that,
among firms that were liquidated in bankruptcy (“Shutdowns”), the owner‐operator
had founded a similar business before or went on to found a similar business in the fu‐
ture in nearly 80% of the cases. The percentage rises to 85% if we count any firm
45

founded by the owner‐operator, regardless of its similarity to the firm in our sample.

The following tables decompose the business experience of owner‐managers. Table 11
focuses on their experience prior to the Chapter 11 filing in our sample. It shows that be‐
tween 45 and 47 percent of all owner‐operators had founded at least one business that
failed before they filed the cases in our sample. There is little difference between owner‐
operators whose Chapter 11 filings led to shut down (“failures”) and those whose busi‐
nesses survived the bankruptcy process (“successes”). Owners of failures were just as
likely as owners of successes to have founded a similar (37.5% and 35.9%, respectively)
or dissimilar (15.0% and 17.2%) business that failed in the past.
Table 12 looks at the post‐bankruptcy experience of owner‐operators. Among
firms that were shut down in bankruptcy, the owner‐operators went on to found an‐
other firm in 50% of the cases. In about 38% of the cases, the new business was similar
to the one that was liquidated in bankruptcy. The percentages are, not surprisingly,
much lower for owner‐managers whose businesses survived the bankruptcy process.
An owner‐operator surely has less incentive to establish a new business if his or her ex‐
isting business continues.
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These estimates, it should be noted, are lower bounds because they are based solely on
data contained in records maintained by the Secretary of State of Illinois. We have not searched
the records of other states to determine whether the entrepreneurs in our sample ever estab‐
lished out‐of‐state businesses.
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Table 10
Whether Owner‐Manager Started a Similar or Dissimilar Businesses Before or After the Chapter 11 Case
Started Similar Business
Started Dissimilar Business
Started Any Business
% (n) (sd)
% (n) (sd)
% (n) (sd)
Industry (SIC No.)
Shutdowns
Other Cases
Shutdowns
Other Cases
Shutdowns
Other Cases
Construction (15‐17)
77.8 (9)
20.0 (5)
66.7 (9)
20.0 (5)
88.9 (9)
40.0 (5)
Manufacturing (20‐39)
75.0 (4)
50.0 (8)
25.0 (4)
50.0 (8)
100.0 (4)
62.5 (8)
Transportation (40‐48)
100.0 (2)
100.0 (2)
0.0 (2)
0.0 (2)
100.0 (2)
100.0 (2)
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50‐51)
50.0 (2)
100.0 (1)
0.0 (2)
0.0 (1)
50.0 (2)
100.0 (1)
Retail Trade (52‐59)
100.0 (3)
63.6 (11)
66.7 (3)
36.4 (11)
100.0 (3)
81.8 (11)
Eating/ Drinking Places (58)
57.1 (7)
66.7 (12)
14.3 (7)
25.0 (12)
71.4 (7)
83.3 (12)
Insurance Agents (60‐69)
50.0 (2)
100.0 (1)
0.0 (2)
0.0 (1)
50.0 (2)
100.0 (1)
Business Services (47‐49, 70‐79)
83.3 (6)
33.3 (12)
50.0 (6)
8.3 (12)
83.3 (6)
41.7 (12)
Professional Services (80‐89)
100.0 (5)
83.3 (12)
0.0 (5)
41.7(12)
100.0 (5)
83.3 (12)
TOTAL
77.5
59.4
32.5
28.13
85.0
70.3
(40) (42.29)
(64) (49.50)
(40) (47.43)
(64) (45.32)
(40) (36.16)
(64) (46.05)

Table 11
Whether Owner‐Manager Started a Similar or Dissimilar Business that Failed Before the Chapter 11 Case
Started Similar Business
Started Dissimilar Business
Started Any Business
% (n) (sd)
% (n) (sd)
% (n) (sd)
Industry (SIC No.)
Shutdowns
Other Cases
Shutdowns
Other Cases
Shutdowns
Other Cases
Construction (15‐17)
33.3 (9)
0.0 (5)
33.3 (9)
20.0 (5)
44.0 (9)
20.0 (5)
Manufacturing (20‐39)
0.0 (4)
12.5 (8)
25.0 (4)
25.0 (8)
25.0 (4)
37.5 (8)
Transportation (40‐48)
0.0 (2)
50.0 (2)
0.0 (2)
0.0 (2)
0.0 (2)
50.0 (2)
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50‐51)
0.0 (2)
100.0 (1)
0.0 (2)
0.0 (1)
0.0 (2)
100.0 (1)
Retail Trade (52‐59)
100.0 (3)
27.2 (11)
0.0 (3)
18.2 (11)
100.0 (3)
36.4 (11)
Eating/ Drinking Places (58)
42.9 (7)
50.0 (12)
14.3 (7)
16.7 (12)
57.1 (7)
66.7 (12)
Insurance Agents (60‐69)
50.0 (2)
100.0 (1)
0.0 (2)
0.0 (1)
50.0 (2)
100.0 (1)
Business Services (47‐49, 70‐79)
33.3 (6)
16.7 (12)
16.7 (6)
8.3 (12)
33.3 (6)
25.0 (12)
Professional Services (80‐89)
60.0 (5)
66.7 (12)
0.0 (5)
25.0 (12)
60.0 (5)
66.7 (12)
TOTAL
37.5
35.9
15.0
17.2
45.0
46.9
(40) (49.03)
(64) (48.36)
(40) (36.16)
(64) (38.03)
(40) (50.38)
(64) (50.30)
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Table 12
Whether Owner‐Manager Started a Similar or Dissimilar Business After the Chapter 11 Case
Started Similar Business
Started Dissimilar Business
Started Any Business
% (n) (sd)
% (n) (sd)
% (n) (sd)
Industry (SIC No.)
Shutdowns
Other Cases
Shutdowns
Other Cases
Shutdowns
Other Cases
Construction (15‐17)
33.3 (9)
20.0 (5)
11.1 (9)
0.0 (5)
44.4 (9)
20.0 (5)
Manufacturing (20‐39)
75.0 (4)
12.5 (8)
25.0 (4)
12.5 (8)
100.0 (4)
25.0 (8)
Transportation (40‐48)
100.0 (2)
50.0 (2)
0.0 (2)
0.0 (2)
100.0 (2)
50.0 (2)
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50‐51)
50.0 (2)
0.0 (1)
0.0 (2)
0.0 (1)
50.0 (2)
0.0 (1)
Retail Trade (52‐59)
0.0 (3)
27.3 (11)
66.7 (3)
27.3 (11)
66.7 (3)
54.6 (11)
Eating/ Drinking Places (58)
14.29 (7)
33.3 (12)
0.0 (7)
8.3 (12)
14.3 (7)
41.7 (12)
Insurance Agents (60‐69)
50.0 (2)
100.0 (1)
0.0 (2)
0.0 (1)
50.0 (2)
100.0 (1)
Business Services (47‐49, 70‐79)
33.3 (6)
8.3 (12)
33.3 (6)
0.0 (13)
50.0 (6)
8.3 (13)
Professional Services (80‐89)
40.0 (5)
41.7 (12)
0.0 (5)
16.7 (12)
40.0 (5)
50.0 (12)
TOTAL
37.5
26.6
15.0
10.9
50.0
35.9
(40) (49.03)
(64) (44.52)
(40) (36.16)
(65) (31.46)
(40) (50.64)
(65) (48.36)

Table 13
Whether Owner‐Manager Started or Continued Running a Similar or Dissimilar Business After the Chapter 11 Case
Started Similar Business
Started Dissimilar Business
Started Any Business
% (n) (sd)
% (n) (sd)
% (n) (sd)
Industry (SIC No.)
Shutdowns
Other Cases
Shutdowns
Other Cases
Shutdowns
Other Cases
Construction (15‐17)
55.6 (9)
20.0 (5)
44.4 (9)
0.0 (5)
66.7 (9)
20.0 (5)
Manufacturing (20‐39)
75.0 (4)
37.5 (8)
25.0 (4)
37.5 (8)
100.0 (4)
62.5 (8)
Transportation (40‐48)
100.0 (2)
100.0 (2)
0.0 (2)
0.0 (2)
100.0 (2)
100.0 (2)
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50‐51)
50.0 (2)
0.0 (1)
0.0 (2)
0.0 (1)
50.0 (2)
0.0 (1)
Retail Trade (52‐59)
0.0 (3)
45.5 (11)
66.7 (3)
27.3 (11)
66.7 (3)
63.6 (11)
Eating/ Drinking Places (58)
57.1 (7)
41.7 (12)
0.0 (7)
25.0 (12)
57.1 (7)
66.7 (12)
Insurance Agents (60‐69)
50.0 (2)
100.0 (1)
0.0 (2)
0.0 (1)
50.0 (2)
100.0 (1)
Business Services (47‐49, 70‐79)
66.7 (6)
16.7 (12)
33.3 (6)
0.0 (13)
66.7 (6)
16.7 (13)
Professional Services (80‐89)
80.0 (5)
50.0 (12)
0.0 (5)
16.7 (12)
80.0 (5)
58.3 (12)
TOTAL
60.0
39.1
22.5
17.2
70.0
51.6
(40) (49.61)
(64) (49.17)
(40) (42.29)
(64) (38.03)
(40) (46.41
(64) (50.37)
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Table 12, however, underestimates the frequency with which owner‐operators
start over again when their businesses fail. Many small entrepreneurs run multiple
firms simultaneously. Instead of increasing the scale of one business to serve a new lo‐
cation, the small entrepreneur may start an entirely separate business. Or the entrepre‐
neur may diversify his or her business portfolio and establish a completely different
business. As with any diversification strategy, by owning multiple businesses an entre‐
preneur effectively avoids the costs of starting over again when any one business fails.
The death of any one business does not disrupt the entrepreneur’s. Table 13 takes ac‐
count of an entrepreneur’s ability to “start over” either by founding a new business or
by continuing other business when one firm fails. Among firms liquidated in bank‐
ruptcy, owner‐operators started a new business or continued other businesses in 70% of
the cases. In 60% of the cases, the new or continued businesses were similar to the one
shut down in Chapter 11.
These results are striking. Over 75% of the owner‐managers in our sample are se‐
rial entrepreneurs. For those whose firms were shut down in bankruptcy, this legal out‐
come was a non‐event. Over 70% of them moved on to other firms. The only effect of
Chapter 11 was to delay the time when they moved on. These figures are very large;
keep in mind that the probability of becoming self‐employed is only about 20% gener‐
ally
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and only 30% among sons of fathers who were once self‐employed.
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Our esti‐

mates are large, but they are reasonable. The median firm in our sample was about
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Douglas Holtz‐Eakin, David Joulfian, and Harvey S. Rosen, Entrepreneurial Decisions
and Liquidity Constraints, 25 Rand J. Econ. 334 (1994).
47

Dunn and Holtz‐Eakin, supra note 31.
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seven years old, as Table 2 showed, and about 40% of the entrepreneurs had founded
businesses that failed before they filed the Chapter 11 petitions in our sample. Thus, a
large fraction of the small‐business owners in our sample had well over seven years of
experience in self‐employment. Previous empirical work has shown that, for entrepre‐
neurs with this much experience, the probability of exiting self‐employment is very low
(indeed, the probability is zero among entrepreneurs with at least eleven years of ex‐
48

perience).

These results seriously undermine the possibility that small businesses in bank‐
ruptcy possess specialized assets that merit the protection of Chapter 11. Owner‐
operators face little or no difficulty in starting over again. Whatever benefit the owner‐
operator enjoys from the Chapter 11 process (such as a reduction in her personal liabil‐
ity for the IRS obligations of the business), the outcome of a Chapter 11 proceeding—
reorganization or liquidation—is largely irrelevant to what they do in the future. The
dry‐wall contractor will continue hang dry wall; the stand‐alone travel agent will re‐
main a stand‐alone travel agent.
B. A case study of asset specificity
Nieman Industries was the first corporation to file a Chapter 11 petition in the
Northern District of Illinois in 1998. By the usual accounting, it is an example of an un‐
successful Chapter 11. No disclosure statement was ever filed and the petition was dis‐
missed without a plan of reorganization being proposed, let alone confirmed. Academ‐
ics have long recognized that most Chapter 11s fail, but some defend it on the ground
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See Evans and Leighton, supra note 36, at 525.
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that failures such as Neiman Industries are a necessary byproduct of a system designed
to preserve viable businesses. In any event, there are jobs and relationships that might
be worth saving. If for every three Niemans that file, one succeeds, Chapter 11 might be
worth its costs.
A closer examination of the business and the entrepreneur who ran it, however,
tells an altogether different story. Nieman Industries is a maker of molded plastics for
automobile, consumer products, computer, and electronic parts supply industries.
Nieman leased the equipment it used to manufacture its plastic parts. Shortly after the
petition, the equipment lessor demanded that the debtor either assume or reject the
lease. Unlike leases of real property, the Bankruptcy Code sets no deadlines for rejecting
or assuming leases of equipment. The Bankruptcy Code gives the judge a free hand to
temporize. The debtor is required to ensure that the lessor is adequately protected for
the interim use of the equipment, but in practice there is an opportunity—implicitly
49

embraced by some academics —to make the lessor bear part of the cost of the Chapter
11. For example, if the debtor can argue that the lease is in fact a secured transaction
and the equipment is worth less than the remaining lease obligations, the debtor is
obliged to pay only for the depreciation in the nominal value of the equipment, not for
50

the time value associated with its use. In this respect, as well as in others, the Bank‐
ruptcy Code provides enough slack to create a subsidy to continue the business.
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See the discussion in Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 Yale L.J.
573 (1998).
50

United Savings Ass’n. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Ass’n., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
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But little is to be gained from keeping a business such as Nieman Industries
alive. Like the vast majority of small corporations in Chapter 11, there is no going‐
concern value. Nieman Industries, the corporation, is a collection of entirely fungible
equipment set up inside a nondescript building in an industrial park. It could be reas‐
sembled in almost no time at small cost. The equipment, while expensive, has no special
51

value in this corporation as opposed to another that makes plastic parts.

If, instead of focusing on the corporation, we look at the owner‐operator, a com‐
pletely different picture emerges. Scott Nieman founded the business with help from
his father (who owned his own plastic molding business) several years before. Scott is
unlikely to work for someone else. By upbringing and temperament, those in his posi‐
tion are willing to incur substantial costs and forego higher income elsewhere to run
52

their own business. But his human capital was not firm specific. Scott had industry‐
specific human capital and the challenge was one of creating the firm that best matched
this human capital. By the time of the Chapter 11, the most valuable asset in the enter‐
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To the extent that equipment for making plastic parts requires customized dyes, these
would belong not to Nieman, but to Nieman’s downstream customers. The idea that specialized
equipment can be used in arms’ length transactions in the market instead of being located
within a particular firm is one of the foundational ideas of industrial organization. Indeed,
Nieman’s business (a supplier of parts to, among others, auto manufacturers) is the iconic ex‐
ample of such relationships. Coase was, of course, the first to understand this. See R.H. Coase,
The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937); R.H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by Gen‐
eral Motors, 43 J L & Econ 15, 21–27 (2000).
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Scott’s father was the owner‐operator of a different business in the same industry.
This alone makes Scott three times more likely than the average person to run his own business.
At this point in his career, a decade after starting Nieman Industries, Scott is exceedingly
unlikely to work for anyone else—ever. Using 1966‐81 data from the National Longitudinal
Study of Young Men, Evans and Leighton, supra note 36, found that the probability of exiting
self‐employment falls from about 10 percent in the early years to 0 percent by the 11th year.
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prise was Scott’s relationships with various customers. This asset did not belong to the
corporation. The creditors of the corporation had no right to Scott’s human capital. This
human capital—industry specific, but not firm specific—would exist regardless of
whether the corporation continued or was liquidated.
In other words, the stakes in this case had nothing to do with the corporation,
but everything to do with Scott and his specialized human capital. Nothing prevented
him from walking away from the corporation, free either to start another business or to
work for someone else. It would be a mistake for the policies governing the reorganiza‐
tion of the corporation Scott founded to distort his career choices. Yet Chapter 11 as
written allows judges to do exactly this. It can be interpreted in a way that keeps Scott’s
human capital tied to Nieman Industries regardless of whether it otherwise makes
sense. The automatic stay and other bankruptcy rules provide a chance to divert assets
from lessors, landlords, and general creditors that make keeping this business afloat
relatively more attractive than starting another.

53

If given the chance to advantage of Chapter 11 in this manner, Scott would be
acting rationally, just as those who remain in a rent‐controlled apartment that is too
small or too far from work are acting rationally. Moreover, such interpretations of
Chapter 11 make it more likely at the margin that someone in Scott’s position will re‐
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In this case, Chapter 11 could have provided two sorts of distortions. First, it may
have allowed Scott to keep the leased equipment and pay something less than he would other‐
wise have to. Second, Scott had guaranteed a $78,000 secured loan from the bank. By putting
Neiman Industries in bankruptcy, Scott can ensure that whatever assets exist go to the bank
rather than, let us say, to trade creditors, as would likely happen if the business continued to
operate outside of bankruptcy.
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main self‐employed and not work for anyone else. But there is an economic distortion
nevertheless. While it might be a good thing to encourage entrepreneurs like Scott to
remain entrepreneurs, it is a bad idea to encourage them in a way that biases them to‐
wards keeping businesses like Nieman Industries alive. Those in Scott’s position are se‐
rial entrepreneurs. They are likely to keep starting businesses until he finds one that
provides the best match with his human capital. Even if we want to encourage him to
be an entrepreneur, we have no reason to encourage him to be with one business rather
than another.
There might be businesses that look on the surface like Nieman Industries but fit
the profile of the traditional candidate for a corporate reorganization. The equipment
might have been specialized. A large group of creditors might have been closing in on
the assets. The speed of the nonbankruptcy debt‐collection process and an inability to
renegotiate with everyone simultaneously might lead to a premature dismantling of the
business. Chapter 11 might give the owner of the business time to form new contracts
and put the business back on course. But these cases are unusual, and Nieman Indus‐
tries was not one of them. To the extent that we interpret the Bankruptcy Code (as some
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Small entrepreneurs are liquidity constrained. Using data on entrepreneurs between
1981 and 1985, one study found that a $100,000 inheritance increased the probability of becom‐
ing self‐employed by 3.3% (from 19.3% to 22.6%). An entrepreneur is more likely to stay in
business if he or she receives a bequest. See Douglas Holtz‐Eakin, David Joulfian, & Harvey S.
Rosen, Sticking it Out: Entrepreneurial Survival and Liquidity Constraints, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 53
(1994). Using data on entrepreneurs between 1981 and 1985, these authors found that a $150,000
inheritance increased the probability of survival by about 1.3 percentage points (the average
probability of survival was 77.6 percent). The implicit subsidy that Chapter 11 provides should
work in the same way at the margin.
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advocate ) to allow cases like Nieman to linger, we are not preserving going‐concern
value, but are instead distorting the career path of the owner‐operator.
In practice, the Bankruptcy Code may cause relatively little distortion of the
small entrepreneur’s career path. At least in the Northern District, the judges are willing
to take decisive action when the appropriate motion is put before them. The judges are
completely aware that the costs of reassembling a business are easy to overstate. As one
judge on the court put it, forming a new business after the old one fails is not the same
as starting from scratch. It is much more like starting a videogame over after one’s char‐
acter has come to an untimely end. Retracing the path (and not repeating the previous
mistakes) is much easier the second time.
When bankruptcy judges are willing to confront issues directly and resolve them
quickly, Chapter 11 creates little or no distortion at all, and the judges in the Northern
District have little taste for delay. Within eight weeks, Nieman Industries’ Chapter 11
petition dismissed. The corporation was dissolved under state law a few weeks after
that. Scott’s career continued on its natural course. Scott’s comparative advantage lay in
identifying those who needed plastic parts and matching them with those who could
make them, rather than in manufacturing the parts themselves. He soon started another
business, one that took advantage of his expertise and his relationships, but without the
fixed overhead costs that doomed Nieman Industries. Scott remains a supplier of cus‐
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See, e.g., A. Mechele Deckerson, The Many Faces of Chapter 11: A Reply to Professor
Baird, 12 Am. Bankr. L. Rev. 109, 117 (2004) (“Without chapter 11, it would be virtually impossi‐
ble for the owner to continue his trade (as a lawyer, chiropractor, plumber, etc ...) or to start an‐
other small business (like an insurance company or funeral home) unless he could discharge the
business debts before attempting to sort out his personal debts.”).
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tomized plastic parts, but subcontracts the actual manufacturing to others. This story is
utterly typical for the small entrepreneur. It is no more desirable that Scott Nieman
spend his life overseeing a manufacturing operation than that Yo‐Yo Ma play the vio‐
lin.
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By conventional accounts, the Chapter 11 of Nieman Industries was a failure.
There was no confirmed plan and no distribution of any kind to the general creditors.
There was no creditors committee and no collective decisionmaking about the fate of
the business. A more appropriate view of Chapter 11, however, should count it as a no‐
table success. Central to the Chapter 11 of Nieman Industries was whether it made
sense for Scott to use his human capital as part of this manufacturing operation. The
Court confronted this question within a few weeks of the petition and answered in the
negative. The equipment went back to the lessor, and Scott found a business that better
matched his skills with the marketplace.
C. The case of restaurants
Restaurants are the small business that requires the greatest capital investment to
start. Even a modest fast‐food operation, such as a mid‐range Subway sandwich shop,
requires an investment of $150,000. A fine dining restaurant easily requires $1 million or
more. It might seem that an important role for Chapter 11 is to preserve such invest‐

56

The analogy is Richard Thaler’s. See Richard Thaler, Address: “Finding Your Cello,” 38
Univ. Chicago Record 7 (June 2003). As Thaler points out, Yo‐Yo Ma began as an indifferent vio‐
linist and discovered his genius only when he switched to the cello. If he had not switched
when he did, he might never have excelled at either. Exactly when Yo‐Yo Ma should have given
up the violin admits of no easy answer. It is never easy to know when to switch jobs or form
new businesses. But nothing suggests that we make things better with a legal rule that pushes
the time forward or backward.
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ments. A restaurateur cannot begin a new restaurant the way a travel agent or insur‐
ance broker can open a new office.
Here again, however, matters are more complicated than they might at first ap‐
pear. The kitchen equipment itself is typically portable and there is a robust secondary
market for it. The ranges, ovens, and counters are often on wheels and in any event are
readily moveable. Moreover, the equipment itself is not expensive relative to the capital
needed to open a restaurant. Indeed, the ovens and stoves used in restaurants cost less
than high‐end equipment for consumer use, as they have none of the insulation or fin‐
ishes that home kitchens require.
To be sure, the build‐out of generic retail space into space suitable for a restau‐
rant is expensive. Merely meeting health code requirements for everything from
handsinks to grease traps to air vents can cost hundreds of thousands. But these in‐
vestments are not firm‐specific. A Mexican restaurant can use the same kitchen space
and the walk‐in refrigerator as readily as an Italian restaurant. Of course, if it turns out
that the space is a poor location for a restaurant, any money spent on the kitchen will be
lost, but Chapter 11 can do nothing to change this.
The build‐out of the dining space, however, is costly and not readily saleable.
While the kitchen of a three‐star restaurant is barely distinguishable from one that
serves the most pedestrian country‐club food, the dining rooms of such restaurants are
radically different. These represent substantial capital investments that are tightly tied
to the business plan of the owner‐operator. Converting the décor of a dining room of an
Italian restaurant to a seafood restaurant can again run into the hundreds of thousands
of dollars. These huge sunk expenditures, however, are incurred by a small fraction of
restaurants. While the décor of the upscale fine‐dining restaurant can run into the mil‐

Baird & Morrison—Page 42

lions, the typical restaurant (and the one that typically ends up in Chapter 11) is a much
more modest affair. Moreover, the amount of money invested is a sunk cost. The value
of the carpeting, wall‐cover, and eclectic furniture of a given restaurant turns entirely
on the revenue they generate going forward. They have value only if they bring in
business.
Restaurants in financial distress are very often in economic distress as well. Res‐
taurants are so prone to fail that a restaurant may not have an institutional lender at all.
They begin without little or no debt in the capital structure, and they get into trouble
because they cannot even meet their operating expenses. The restaurant stays in busi‐
ness by stretching out payments to trade creditors, falling behind to the landlord, and
then invading the trusts established for withholding taxes. The restaurant’s inability to
pay creditors signals that it has no future as a going concern. Any assets specialized to
this particular restaurant are worthless.
Table 14 makes these points clear. Restaurants are among the firms least likely to
have bank debt; only 26% of restaurants have any institutional debt. Even among those
that do, such debt accounts for only a quarter of the debt of the median firm. For other
firms, it accounts for nearly half of the debt burden. Failing restaurants are not in trou‐
ble because they are unable to repay their investors. Rather, they are in financial distress
because they are in economic distress. They are unable to pay ongoing trade debt and
taxes. Restaurants are, for example, among the most likely to have IRS debt (68%). And
among those with IRS debt, unpaid taxes account for 21% of total debt, a much higher
percentage than we find in any other type of firm outside of the services sector. Most
restaurants in Chapter 11 have business models that have failed. Their hard assets may
be specialized, but they are not worth saving on that account.
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Industry (SIC No.)
Construction (15‐17)
Manufacturing (20‐39)
Transportation (40‐48)
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50‐51)
Retail Trade (52‐59)
Eating/ Drinking Places (58)
Insurance Agents (60‐69)
Business Services (47‐49, 70‐79)
Professional Services (80‐89)
TOTAL
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Table 14
Debt Composition of Firms in Chapter 11
Secured debt as % of total
Firms with bank
debt, among firms with
Firms with IRS
debt
secured debt
debt
(%) (n) (sd)
(median) (mean) (sd)
(%) (freq) (sd)
85.7 (14)
37.6 (36.9)
85.7 (14)
50.0 (12)
65.1 (63.8)
36.4 (11)
25.0 (4)
25.6 (25.6)
33.3 (3)
100.0 (3)
52.1 (62.3)
33.3 (3)
57.1 (14)
41.8 (46.9)
41.7 (12)
26.3 (19)
26.7 (40.8)
68.4(19)
0 (3)
. (.)
66.7 (3)
50.0 (18)
41.6 (46.1)
56.3 (16)
52.9 (17)
52.4 (51.7)
76.5 (17)
51.0 (104)
43.6 (47.1)
61.2 (98)
(50.23)
(25.36)
(48.97)

IRS debt as % of total debt,
among firms with IRS debt
(median) (mean) (sd)
6.6 (11.1)
8.6 (34.3)
0.6 (.6)
6.5 (6.5)
1.5 (11.5)
21.0 (25.0)
1.6 (1.6)
22.6 (29.8)
22.4 (30.3)
12.7 (22.0)
(24.94)

Three restaurants in our sample did reorganize successfully and remain in busi‐
ness today. In none of these cases, however, did the Chapter 11 have much to do with
preserving going‐concern value. Consider, for example, the Chapter 11 case of a Sub‐
way sandwich shop that had been sold to a new owner only a few months before. The
owner‐operator of a Subway sandwich shop was inexperienced and the business oper‐
ated at a loss. Mistakes included hiring too large a staff and overpaying sales tax. The
short time spent in Chapter 11 allowed him to fix these problems. He fired fulltime
workers and replaced them with a succession of part‐time workers in addition to other
management changes. He proposed and confirmed a 100% plan and several years later
sold the business to someone else and, as we have seen many times, went on to acquire
a new one.
This entrepreneur’s successful use of Chapter 11 is different from the usual story
told about Chapter 11. The business had little in the way of specialized assets. The
equipment in a Subway sandwich shop is usually leased and is readily moved. The
money needed to convert a leased storefront to Subway franchise is small. Indeed, it
was sufficiently small that after the entrepreneur who went through Chapter 11 sold it,
the new owner of the franchise moved the business two doors down. He was able to
close at one location on one day and open the new one (with the same equipment) the
next. There was no collective decisionmaking involved either, but rather tough deci‐
sions (such replacing all the permanent employees with part‐time workers) that suc‐
cessful entrepreneurs need to make to survive. This case, unlike the overwhelming ma‐
jority of the other restaurants in the sample, had a business plan that was fundamen‐
tally sound.
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A similar theme emerges from the case of Taco Fiesta. The owner‐operator of a
thriving Mexican restaurant opened another at a different location that failed. The busi‐
ness ended up owing the landlord at the second location almost $60,000. The owner‐
operator was personally liable on this debt. In this case, the challenge the owner‐
operator faced was one of returning to his core competence. He likely could have done
this by walking away from this restaurant, filing his own personal bankruptcy petition,
and starting a new restaurant. But it was marginally easier to keep running this restau‐
rant and use Chapter 11 to resolve disputes with the outstanding creditors.

57

Again, the problem in Taco Fiesta had little to do with asset specificity. Instead it
was a case in which the serial entrepreneur was able to match his human capital with a
business by returning to the sound business embedded inside the one that failed. The
Chapter 11 succeeded not because it preserved going‐concern value, but because it did
not distort the entrepreneur’s decisionmaking. As we show in Part III, this is the strik‐
ing characteristic of the successful Chapter 11 reorganization. A successful business
emerges only if the entrepreneur’s skills are matched with a business already inside the
existing one. This match, however, bears little relationship with firm‐specific capital.
Because no specialized physical capital is involved, the owner could recreate the match
at low cost even if the firm was liquidated. To be sure, the costs, while low, are not zero,
and Chapter 11 may reduce transaction costs in cases like Taco Fiesta. If an owner‐
operator successfully operates a business but fails in an effort to expand it, Chapter 11
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In this case, as in one other successful reorganization, the owner‐operator filed a per‐
sonal bankruptcy petition at the same time. Personal bankruptcy petitions are relatively com‐
mon at some point in the careers of the serial entrepreneurs in our sample. About half file their
own personal bankruptcy petition at one time or another.
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can help him or her to run to the old business. The net effect of Chapter 11, however, is
unclear even here. The bankruptcy process comes with its own administrative costs.
More to the point, Chapter 11 rarely succeeds when there is no core business inside the
existing corporate shell to which the entrepreneur can return. As we discuss in the next
part, the Chapter 11 process simply does not aligns itself with the needs of the serial en‐
trepreneur in any other environment.

III. Why Chapter 11?
In Part II, we showed that entrepreneurs rarely use Chapter 11 to preserve a go‐
ing‐concern surplus. This part asks why entrepreneurs use Chapter 11 at all. If the typi‐
cal small entrepreneur is searching for the right match between her human capital and a
business, why should she use Chapter 11 to remain with the financially distressed busi‐
ness rather than start a new one? The short answer is that she does not. Fewer than 1%
of entrepreneurs running a failing business turn to Chapter 11.

58

The typical small en‐

trepreneur does not linger with a financially distressed business. Entrepreneurs who try
one business usually cut their losses and go on to start another when the first fails. As a
general matter, small entrepreneurs do not use Chapter 11.
Even so, the appropriate question is not why so few entrepreneurs use Chapter
11, but why any do, given that it does little or nothing to preserve going‐concern value.
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Owner‐operators shut down more than a million businesses each year. See Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Business Employment Dynamics project (bls.gov/bdm/home.htm), Custom Ta‐
bles (reporting that 1.1 to 1.4 million establishment closings per year during the 1994‐2003 pe‐
riod). By contrast only 10,000 file Chapter 11 petitions. Even this overstates the importance of
Chapter 11, as many Chapter 11s involve individuals or represent multiple filings by related
entities or serial filings by the same entity.
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Our study of the Northern District points to three different answers: asset sales, bar‐
gaining leverage, and lock‐in. Asset sales are often more easily and more efficiently ac‐
complished in a Chapter 11 proceeding than under state law. These cases, however, are
59

only a minority of Chapter 11s. Most businesses do not enter bankruptcy to avoid in‐
efficiencies in state‐law. They enter precisely to take advantage of potential inefficien‐
cies created by Chapter 11. One of these inefficiencies is that, in bankruptcy, entrepre‐
neurs enjoy significantly stronger bargaining power in a dispute with a creditor, land‐
lord, or some other third party. Chapter 11 is an attractive vehicle for extracting rents
from these counterparties. Another potential inefficiency is the lock‐in effect: Chapter 11
may encourage owner‐managers to remain too long in existing business structures. We
take up each of these issues in the following sections.
A. Asset Sales
For small businesses as well as large ones, Chapter 11 offers a way for a finan‐
cially distressed business to sell its assets and divide the proceeds among the claimants.
As Panel A of Table 15 shows, in about 10% of the Chapter 11 petitions in the Northern
District (10 cases), the bankruptcy judge served as an auctioneer. In half of these cases
(5), the firm entered Chapter 11 solely to sell itself as a going‐concern to the highest
bidder. The remaining five firms entered bankruptcy primarily to sell assets and use the
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Over the population of Chapter 11 cases as a whole, asset sales take place only in a
minority. If we focus on larger cases, however, sales are more common and make take place in
half the cases or more. See Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56
Stan. L. Rev. 673 (2003).
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Table 15
Reasons for Filing Chapter 11 Petitions, By Case Outcome
Shutdowns &
Restructurings
Dismissals
Reorganizations
without a plan
(n=65)
(n=23)
(n=8)
(%) (freq)
(%) (freq)
(%) (freq)
Panel A: Types of Chapter 11 Filings
Asset sales
Exploiting enhanced bargaining power
Obvious Lock‐In
“Traditional” Chapter 11’s
Panel B: Evidence of Obvious Lock‐In
Converted or Dismissed because …
Ignoring procedural requirements
Failing to pay ongoing expenses
Abusing process to harm creditors
Evading liability for fraud or other wrongdoing
Trying to avoid loss of executory contracts
Explicitly using Ch. 11 to change business model
Using Ch. 11 to favor insider‐creditors
Any Evidence Of Lock‐In
Panel C: Evidence of “Traditional Cases”
Overexpansion
Cost overruns from reconfiguring assets
Cash shortages from loss of customers
Asbestos liability
Any Traditional Event
Traditional Events, excluding sales, lock‐in, etc.
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6.2 (4)
1.5 (1)
83.1 (54)
3.1 (2)

12.5 (1)
37.5 (3)
73.9 (17)

12.5 (1)

47.7 (31)
36.9 (24)
12.3 (8)
13.9 (9)
7.7 (5)
3.1 (2)
1.5 (1)
83.1 (54)
7.7 (5)
3.1 (2)
9.2 (6)
20.0 (13)
3.1 (2)

Going Concern
Sales
(n=8)
(%) (freq)
62.5 (5)
37.5 (3)
0.0 (0)

37.5 (3)

37.5 (3)
47.8 (11)
8.7 (2)
13.0 (3)
4.4 (1)
73.9 (17)
73.9 (17)

12.5 (1)
25.0 (2)
12.5 (1)

25.0 (2)

50.0 (4)
12.5 (1)

25.0 (2)
0.0 (0)

All Cases
(n=104)
(%) (freq)
9.62 (10)
3.9 (4)
54.8 (57)
19.2 (20)

29.8 (31)
23.1 (24)
7.7 (8)
11.5 (12)
4.8 (5)
1.9 (2)
1.0 (1)
54.8 (57)
18.3 (19)
5.8 (6)
9.6 (10)
1.0 (1)
34.62 (36)
19.2 (20)

proceeds to increase cash flow sufficiently to overcome their financial distress. As Panel
A indicates, for most of these firms (4) the sale did not ensure a successful Chapter 11
case; they ended up in liquidation or with their cases dismissed.
Using Chapter 11 to effect a sale of the assets is especially likely when one of the
potential buyers identified before the bankruptcy is allied with the current owner‐
manager. The Chapter 11 process ensures that the sale brings top dollar and prevents
self‐dealing. Billy’s Good Life Café illustrates how assets are sold in Chapter 11. Billy
Moss had opened other restaurants before attempting the Good Life Café. He had to
make a large capital investment to convert the space into the café he desired. When it
failed, there was no possibility of a going‐concern sale. Any restaurant on this site (even
one run by Billy) would have to change the décor, the menu, and the market niche in
order to succeed. Nevertheless, any new restaurant would be able to take advantage of
the investment already made in converting the space into a restaurant. As a serial en‐
trepreneur, Billy Moss might be the one who put the highest value on this space. Out‐
side of bankruptcy, however, neither Billy nor a group allied with him could acquire the
asset from the corporation and be confident that they could take it free from the debts of
the existing business. Chapter 11, however, provides a mechanism that allows Billy to
bid for asset and take it free of the claims of the creditors in the event he turns out to be
the person who values it the most. As it happened, another group provided the high
bidder. Like the Good Life Café, the restaurant they opened failed too. The space finally
60

became a successful restaurant (serving Mexican food) under its third owners.
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This story is not unusual. For an example of a restaurant that went through five incar‐
nations (and two bankruptcies) before finding its niche, see id., at 687‐89.
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For both large cases and small, Chapter 11 is becoming the platform that allows
the sale of assets free and clear of old claims and encumbrances. If one were designing a
legal system from scratch, it is not obvious that one would want a mechanism originally
designed for restructuring 19th Century railroads to provide the avenue for a going‐
concern sale of assets. Nevertheless, Chapter 11 seems to work effectively in this envi‐
ronment.
B. Bargaining Power
Some entrepreneurs are drawn to Chapter 11 because it gives them a unique op‐
portunity to extract concessions from creditors. In at least four cases in our sample
(3.9%), the owner‐managers filed a petition solely to exploit their enhanced bargaining‐
power. In many other cases, exploitation of bargaining power was an important part of
the reason for filing.
Consider, for example, Myron & Phil’s Steakhouse. The owners dismissed an
employee who in turn sued for sexual harassment and age discrimination. The case
went to trial, but ten minutes after it began, the owners put the restaurant in Chapter 11.
This well‐established Skokie restaurant had few problems other than this disgruntled
61

employee. The Chapter 11 changed the dynamics of the negotiations between the
owner‐operators of the business and the employee. Once the lawsuit was settled, the
Chapter 11 case was dismissed.

61

Indeed, the only other problem of significance was a race discrimination action a cook
brought against them. The owners ultimately secured a dismissal of this claim in Chapter 11.
They were helped in large measure by a long letter the cook had written that documented nu‐
merous instances of abuses and misbehavior on their part. None of them, however, evidenced
race discrimination.
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Another case in which Chapter 11 was used to change bargaining dynamics is
ABO Taxicab. In this case, the creditor that had financed the purchase of the medallions
threatened to levy on the assets. As in Myron & Phil’s, no other creditors were in the
picture. The Chapter 11 again changed the bargaining dynamics and once the parties
reached agreement, the case was dismissed. Here again is a case in which there are no
firm‐specific assets, and the entrepreneur is able to and does in fact start many other
businesses. Indeed, the entrepreneur in ABO started at least ten other cab companies,
one of which also entered Chapter 11, again resolving a dispute with the creditor who
had financed the purchase of the medallions.
Some cases involve both a sale and a strengthening of the bargaining hand. M&V
Corp. was a family‐run music and video retailer founded January 31, 1983. It entered
Chapter 11 so it could sell a piece of real estate that its bank would have otherwise fore‐
closed upon. Once the sale took place, the case was dismissed. The business itself sub‐
sequently closed, but there was again no particular going‐concern surplus associated
with it. The owner‐operator then directed his attention to a different music and video
store—this third.
In part because of the special treatment of leases and executory contracts, entre‐
preneurs sometimes use Chapter 11 to improve their positions with their landlords or
parties with whom they have long‐term contracts. One case, for example, involved a
Greek restaurant that had fallen behind on its rent. Its landlord had the chance to sell
the underlying real estate to a third party. By filing for bankruptcy and curing the de‐
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fault, the restaurant could ensure that it could share in the premium that the landlord
62

obtained from the sale.

C. Lock‐In and Liquidity
Asset sales and simple exploitation of bargaining power account for only about
13% of the sample. Lock‐in explains most of the remaining cases. The primary attraction
of Chapter 11 is that it offers a venue in which a small‐business owner can (temporarily)
fend off landlords and trade creditors, increase short‐term cash flow, and cut deals with
large creditors (usually secured lenders and the IRS) to whom the owner had given per‐
63

sonal guarantees of the firms’ indebtedness. Thanks to the Bankruptcy Code’s auto‐
matic stay and priority rules, a small business can operate in bankruptcy free from
creditor collection efforts and is barred from servicing its debt until a plan of reorgani‐
zation is confirmed. Additionally, the business can exercise its powers under section 365
to assume profitable executory contracts, reject (i.e., breach) unprofitable ones, and de‐
fer paying breach‐of‐contract damages until a plan is confirmed (and, in the case of real
estate leases, these damages will be capped, thanks to section 502). These provisions of
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When Chapter 11 can be used to capture such substantive benefits, we should be
aware that it will have an effect on bargaining that takes place outside of bankruptcy. A debtor
who can credibly threaten to invoke §365 in bankruptcy should be able to capture the benefits in
bargaining with the landlord or contracting party without actually having to file.
63

A promise not to file for bankruptcy is ordinarily unenforceable. See United States v.
Royal Business Funds Corp., 724 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1983). Exceptions typically arise only when there
is a comprehensive workout outside of bankruptcy. See, e.g., In re Colonial Ford, 24 Bankr. 1014
(D. Utah 1982). Hence, the distortions Chapter 11 introduces cannot be cashed out in advance
through Coasean bargaining.
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the Code improve a small firm’s liquidity, at least for a short while, largely at the ex‐
pense of unsecured creditors.
Liquidity is an important determinant of the life‐span of small businesses. While
64

starting a new business is not costly, it is not costless either. Owner‐operators do not
have ready access to credit markets. The risks associated with any new business are
large and much of the money needed to start the business is not recoverable unless the
business succeeds. Any outside investor would have to be an equity investor and this is
usually not feasible. The costs of gathering enough information to distinguish the bad
risks from the good are too large. Moreover, the owner‐operators who run these bene‐
fits enjoy substantial nonmonetary returns. They are willing to accept less income and
65

fewer prospects for growth in income to run the business. The psychic benefits they
enjoy do not form the basis on which outsiders make investments. Thus, owner‐
operators are more likely to keeping running their own businesses if they receive an in‐
heritance.

66

At the margin, anything that makes running a particular business cheaper

will make an entrepreneur more likely to remain with that business.
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Using data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), a survey of in‐
dividuals preparing to start new businesses, a recent study found that the median estimated
start‐up cost was $6,000 for solo ventures and $20,000 for ventures founded by teams of entre‐
preneurs. See Blade Consulting Corp., Expected Costs of Startup Ventures, (Nov. 2003) (available
at sba.gov/advo/research/rs232tot.pdf).
65

Hamilton, supra note 29.
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An entrepreneur is more likely to start a business if he or she has greater personal
wealth or receives bequests. See Dunn & Holtz‐Eakin, supra; David G. Blanchflower and An‐
drew J. Oswald, What Makes An Entrepreneur?, 16 J. Lab. Econ. 26 (1998); Holtz‐Eakin, Joulfian,
and Rosen, supra note 46.
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In addition to providing short‐term liquidity, Chapter 11 offers a venue in which
the entrepreneur can strike deals with creditors to whom she will be personally liable if
the firm fails to repay them in full. The vast majority of small businesses (85%, as shown
in Table 17 below) will enter bankruptcy with debts that have been personally guaran‐
teed by the owner manager. These debts are generally owed to secured lenders and the
IRS, both of whom appear willing to renegotiate the debts and the personal guarantees
67

if the entrepreneur brings her firm into Chapter 11.

Although more work must be

done before we can identify the reasons why these creditors are willing to renegotiate in
Chapter 11, two reasons seem plausible. First, secured creditors and the IRS may expect
a greater return from a Chapter 11 filing than from a quick liquidation of the firm—
under state law or Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code—because they can exercise con‐
trol over the Chapter 11 process and thereby obtain large share of the firm’s value (at
the expense of unsecured creditors). Aside from secured creditors and the IRS, very few
creditors play an active role in the vast majority of small business bankruptcies. Second,
secured creditors and the IRS may be willing to renegotiate an owner‐manager’s per‐
sonal guarantee because the process of renegotiation gives the creditors leverage during
the Chapter 11 process. Most owner‐managers have very little wealth to satisfy personal
68

guarantees; most of it has been invested in their businesses. There is little, then, a
creditor will gain from enforcing a personal guarantee in state courts. But enforcement
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Anecdotal evidence, obtained from conversations with bankruptcy judges, lawyers,
and FDIC bank examiners, suggests that the IRS will not negotiate corporate debts unless the
corporation has filed a bankruptcy petition and that a secured lender will sometimes offer to
forgive an owner’s personal guarantee if the corporation files a petition.
68

See Gentry and Hubbard, supra, at 25.
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will impose high costs on owner‐managers, who may be forced to file individual bank‐
ruptcy petitions. These costs give creditors bargaining power, which may be useful dur‐
ing Chapter 11 proceedings.
Together, increased liquidity and opportunities to renegotiate personal indebt‐
edness make Chapter 11 attractive to small business entrepreneurs and, as a conse‐
quence, make remaining with a failing business more attractive than starting a new one
(or becoming an employee of a firm), even though the latter may be a better match with
the entrepreneur’s human capital. Chapter 11 allows the entrepreneur to remain with a
failing business for a while longer. In the interim, she can hope that the business will
miraculously turn around. She would not otherwise wait to start a new business, but,
with Chapter 11, continuing with the old business is costless while starting a new one is
not. To the extent she can delay incurring those costs, she is better off. The Code in these
cases provides the most straightforward kind of lock‐in effect. If a legal rule lowers the
rent of your apartment, you are more likely to stay there even if it makes more sense for
you to live somewhere else.
At least 55% of the filings exhibit strong evidence of lock‐in, as Table 15 illus‐
trates. Chapter 11 is most likely doing little more than subsidizing a failed business
when the owner‐entrepreneur is not complying with even its most basic ground rules,
69

let alone trying to put together a plan of reorganization. When the owner‐operator
violates an explicit order of the court, fails to attend the mandatory meeting with the
creditors, or neglects to fill out the forms listing the business’s assets and liabilities, we
can safely infer that she is merely playing a waiting game. These cases constitute 30% of
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These cases are labeled “Ignoring procedural requirements” in Panel B.
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all the bankruptcy petitions filed in the Northern District in 1998. They make up close to
half of all cases that ended with shutdown or dismissal. Another important indicator of
lock‐in is whether the owner‐manager used Chapter 11 to avoid paying not just out‐
standing debt but also ongoing expenses. We see this indicator in about 23% of the cases
overall.
A number of other indicators that the entrepreneur is playing for time exist as
well. Some owner‐operators use the Chapter 11 process to hide assets, evade (temporar‐
ily) liability for theft of the firm’s assets, or misuse of client’s deposits and the like. In
other cases, the owner‐operator files Ch. 11 petitions in a last ditch effort to prevent
suppliers from terminating resale or licensing agreements. Chapter 11 expands however
much time is available to strike a bargain.
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Each of these evidences a lock‐in effect,

cases in which Chapter 11 induces the owner‐operator to remain with the business too
long. At least one is present in about 55% of all cases and 83% of all shutdowns and
dismissals.
In these cases, Chapter 11 pushes the owner‐operator in exactly the wrong direc‐
tion. Our point here is not the familiar one that the Chapter 11 filing thwarted creditors.
In most of these cases, there was little for the creditors in any event.

71

Rather Chapter 11

delays the owner‐operator’s transition from an existing establishment to a new business
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As noted above, the extra time bankruptcy allows cannot be folded into a nonbank‐
ruptcy because promises not to take advantage of Chapter 11 are not enforceable.
71

To the extent that Chapter 11 affected third parties, it was most often the landlord.
The automatic stay prevents the eviction that would otherwise take place under state law.
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that better matches with his or her skills. But we should be careful not to overstate the
costs that Chapter 11 is imposing. Cases in which the owner‐operator is simply using
Chapter 11 to keep a failing business around longer are not hard to identify. Within a
few weeks, a creditor or a landlord brings a motion to dismiss, and the case itself leaves
the system quickly—typically within three months.

73

Thus it is not surprising that so

few failing firms actually file bankruptcy petitions. Able judges can minimize the costs
of this lock‐in effect.
So far we have looked at lock‐in without reference to those cases in which the
debtor is able to confirm a plan of reorganization. An initial look at the data might sug‐
gest lock‐in is not a large issue in these cases. As Panel C of Table 15 shows, the twenty‐
three reorganization cases exhibited financial distress, a classic marker of a prototypical
Chapter 11 case. Nearly half the businesses suffered financial distress as a result of
overexpansion. Two faced unexpected expenses in connection with the assets they had
bought for their business. Another 13% of the businesses suffered distress because im‐
portant clients cancelled contracts or because members of the firm quit and took impor‐
tant clients with them. Finally, one firm entered Chapter 11 with the classic example of
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A representative example is Automobile Dealer Services, a consulting firm that spe‐
cialized in giving seminars for the employees of auto dealerships to train them to sell appear‐
ance protection products—rustproofing, paint protection, fabric protection and sound treat‐
ment—that are designed to make a car look better and last longer. By the time of the Chapter 11
petition, this business idea seemed to have played itself out and it was time for the entrepre‐
neur—someone who had already formed a number of other businesses—to move on to new
projects.
73

Morrison, supra note 1, shows that bankruptcy judges are able to ferret out these cases
quickly. Indeed, the evidence is consistent with the conjecture that the judges are as adept in
making these shutdown decisions as market actors subject to the same constraints.
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financial distress—asbestos liability arising from operations the business had discontin‐
ued nearly 40 years before. In total, about 74% of the reorganizations (17 of the 23) in‐
volved a firm that exhibited a classic marker of financial—not economic—distress. This
statistic might suggest that Chapter 11 added value here because the firms were viable
and suffered distress only because of a temporary mismatch between revenue and the
cost of servicing debt.
A closer look at the data suggests otherwise, however. As Panel C also shows,
the same markers of financial distress (such as overexpansion) can be found in a fifth of
the businesses that were shutdown in bankruptcy. As we saw, these businesses exhib‐
ited strong indicators of lock‐in as well. The traditional markers of financial distress,
then, tell us little about the absence of lock‐in. There are at least three reasons for this.
First, we derive our “markers” of financial distress from the self‐serving schedules and
other reports the owner‐operators fill out. They have every incentive to convince judges
and other creditors that they were merely suffering temporary cash shortages. Second,
financial distress is often a product of economic distress. An unprofitable business will
often be one that loses significant clients or takes on business it cannot serve.
Finally, and most importantly, even a business suffering pure financial (not eco‐
nomic) distress is not necessarily one worth saving in Chapter 11. To be sure, a dis‐
tressed business may become profitable again by reducing its scale of operations, but it
may make more sense for the owner‐operator to shut down the existing business and
start over again. Starting from scratch would not make sense if the business used spe‐
cialized assets, but Table 16 suggests that asset specificity is as insignificant in reorgan‐
ized firms as it is in firms that suffered shut down or dismissal. Measuring asset speci‐
ficity as the ratio of non‐office equipment to total assets, the degree of specificity in re‐

Baird & Morrison—Page 59

Table 16
Measures of Asset Specificity for the Median Firm, by Chapter 11 Outcome
Shutdowns &
Restructurings
Going Concern
All Cases
Dismissals
Reorganizations
without plan
Sales
Measure of Specificity
(n=104) (%)
(n=65) (%)
(n=23) (%)
(n=8) (%)
(n=8) (%)
Land & equipment
28.9
37.0
19.2
21.1
45.3
Equipment
16.5
16.5
12.9
13.7
38.9
Non‐office equipment
5.5
5.3
8.5
9.1
22.3
(0.72)
(0.92)
(0.30)
Note: parentheses provide p‐values for a Wilcoxon rank‐sum test of the difference between the median in that column and
the median in “Shutdowns & Dismissals.”

Table 17
Personal Liability of Owner‐Manager
Shutdowns &
Restructurings
Going Concern
All Cases
Dismissals
Reorganizations
without a plan
Sales
(n=100) (%)
(n=62) (%)
(n=23) (%)
(n=7) (%)
(n=8) (%)
Personal Guarantees
55.8
58.5
65.2
12.5
50.0
(.57)
(.01)
(.46)
Personal Tax Liability
61.2
63.3
78.3
42.9
12.5
(.20)
(.08)
(.00)
Any Personal Liability
85.0
90.3
91.3
57.1
50.0
(.89)
(.03)
(.01)
Note: parentheses give p‐values of a t‐test for the difference between the percentage in that column and the percentage
in “Reorganizations.”
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organizations (8.5%) is only slightly (and not statistically) greater than it is in firms that
suffered shutdown or dismissal (5.3%). And, as we explained in Part II, these measures
of specificity are upper bounds. There is little reason, then, to think that the reorganiza‐
tions in our sample represented efforts to preserve going‐concern surplus.
Why, then, was Chapter 11 attractive to owner‐managers who could downsize
their firms simply by starting over again? We get a sense of the answer by looking
closely at the reorganization cases. A typical example is Luczak Brothers, in which an
entrepreneur entered Chapter 11, confirmed a plan of reorganization, and continued to
run the same business after it emerged from Chapter 11. Luczak Brothers is a family
business founded in 1897 that does ornamental plasterwork. It encountered financial
distress because it took on an enormous project—the plasterwork for the renovation of
the home of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra—and underestimated its costs by
$600,000. It made mistakes on other jobs as well. Luczak is a classic case of overexpan‐
sion and might seem a poster child for Chapter 11.
Did Chapter 11 preserve any going‐concern surplus in this case? No. This busi‐
ness, like virtually all of those that successfully reorganized, had little in the way of
firm‐specific assets. By far its biggest asset was $500,000 in receivables. The other assets
included real estate, several cars, and $10,000 of inventory. It had only $20,000 in
equipment and a quarter of it was office equipment. James Luczak would run an orna‐
mental plaster business if Luczak Brothers, Inc., disappeared. He would continue to
employ the same people and exploit the same relationships he always had. There are
only modest costs in starting a new business and no reason at all to encourage him to
use the existing corporate entity—Luczak Brothers, Inc.—to conduct his affairs. The ex‐
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isting legal regime, however, encourages someone in the position of Luczak to do ex‐
actly this.
The overriding issue in Luczak Bros. was not keeping specialized assets together
or saving jobs, but escaping personal tax liability. Like eighty percent of those who con‐
firmed a plan of reorganization in Chapter 11 (see Table 17), Luczak invaded trust
funds containing employee withholding taxes to keep the business running. By doing
this, he converted what was a corporate obligation into a personal obligation. Even
though he nominally did business in limited liability form, James Luczak did not have
the option of walking away from this business and starting another on a clean slate.
Personal liability itself does not bias Luczak towards remaining with the existing
business. In principle, the obligation exists whether the business survives or not. Hence,
if personal liability for the debt were the only issue he would still choose the path that
provided the best fit with his human capital. In practice, however, James Luczak has a
better chance of compromising his tax obligations by keeping Luczak Brothers, Inc.,
alive in Chapter 11. The IRS is much more willing to compromise its claims (and release
the principal from personal liability) in a Chapter 11 reorganization that outside. In
other words, the way in which the IRS handles these sorts of tax liabilities pushed James
Luczak towards running his plaster business under the aegis of Luczak Brothers Inc.,
even though there is little or no social benefit from organizing his business this way.
A simpler but similar case is Kosick, Inc. It performs fiberglass and gel‐coat re‐
pair to boats and trucks. A majority of the work is contracted through various marinas
and consists largely of warranty repairs on new boats. Kosick got into trouble by decid‐
ing to construct two 16‐foot New Jersey speed skiffs, spending in excess of $30,000 on
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them. No buyers appeared. The only debt was to the IRS. Chapter 11 was merely a way
to deal with government.
Again, then, we see lock‐in. Chapter 11 is attractive because it gives owner‐
managers access to subsidies unavailable in the marketplace. By filing a corporate
Chapter 11 petition, small entrepreneurs can haggle over (and defer payment of) tax
claims and operate, at least temporarily, with a smaller fraction of their revenues going
to service other debt. In this fashion Chapter 11 encourages owner‐operators managers
to remain with an existing business. While the owner‐operator can return to running
the old business and be successful, we do not know whether, absent the distortions
brought about by Chapter 11, he would have been better off starting a different kind of
business. There is still a lock‐in effect. The owner‐operator has a powerful incentive to
return to his past, regardless of whether he could do better by trying something new.
To be sure, the costs of lock‐in are not substantial in many reorganization cases.
James Luczak would run an ornamental plaster business whether Luczak Brothers. Inc.
continued or not. To the extent he needed to change his operations (such as scaling back
the number of jobs and increasing his supervision of each one), he could do this as well
using the existing legal shell as with another. The lock‐in effect of Chapter 11 may be
small when financial distress has been brought on by overexpansion. When the best
match of the owner‐operator’s human capital is a return to a smaller, but more sound
business using the same assets and exploiting the same relationships, Chapter 11 creates
relatively few distortions. Indeed, as Table 18 shows, among the 11 firms that suffered
overexpansion and reorganized, only one subsequently failed (and it did so four years
after exiting bankruptcy).
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Table 18
Characteristics of Reorganizations
Overexpansion cases
Asbestos case
11
1
1

Frequency
100% plans
Failed within 1 year
Failed within 2 years
Failed within 5 years
Failed after confirming 100% plan

1

Other cases
11
6
4
1
3
5

Overexpansion, however, characterizes only 11 of the 23 cases that resulted in
reorganization. The remaining 12 cases are a mixed bag, some featuring other classic
indicators of financial distress and others suffering some unspecified type of distress.
For these businesses, the costs of Chapter 11 are larger. As Table 18 illustrates, four
failed within one year, five within two, and eight within five. Three of the four that
failed within a year had confirmed reorganization plans that promised repayment of
74

100% of the claims of unsecured creditors. When financial distress is brought on by
factors other than overexpansion, businesses commonly put forward excessively opti‐
mistic reorganization plans and then fail. Chapter 11 encourages these owner‐operators
to gamble (using money supplied by creditors and the government) on the resurrection
of failing firms.
Thix Enterprises provides an illustration. Thomas Hix ran a gasoline and auto
service station as Thix Enterprises. He had purchased the station in 1995; he had been
service manager there for several years. The business was at best marginally profitable
when Hix purchased it. Thix steadily lost money and fell behind in tax payments. Costs

74

Among firms that entered bankruptcy for reasons other than overexpansion, half con‐
firmed 100% plans. By comparison, only one of the overexpansion cases involved a 100% plan.
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were reduced by slashing payroll from 24 to 10 employees, reducing employee health
benefits, and outsourcing management of the gas pumps. When the IRS threatened to
place a lien on its assets, Hix put the corporation in Chapter 11. A plan of reorganiza‐
tion was confirmed, but the problems with the business remained. Amoco refused to
renew its lease. It appears that Hix lacked the skills to run this business and ultimately
went to work for an auto service company. He filed his own personal Chapter 7 bank‐
ruptcy petition in 2002, still encumbered by the IRS obligations of Thix Enterprises.
Without Chapter 11, he might have been able to start a different business or confront
the fact that he was not cut out to be an entrepreneur earlier.
Apart from cases of overexpansion, only an odd conjunction of events leads the
owner‐operator to want to place a business in Chapter 11 and for that business to re‐
main a good match for her human capital. The type of debt that makes Chapter 11 at‐
tractive—a tax obligation on which the owner‐operator is personally liable—usually
arises only when the business experiences extreme economic distress. Owner‐operators
typically invade trust funds (thereby incurring not only personal, but potentially crimi‐
nal liability) as a last resort. Invasion of trusts funds follows from an inability to meet
ongoing operating expenses. Unless things change, the business will fail, and, apart
from cases of overexpansion, it is unlikely that things will change. Few businesses ex‐
perience economic distress sufficiently severe to lead the owner‐operators to invade the
trust funds, yet remain sufficiently sound that running them on a going‐forward basis is
possible.
All this might suggest that Chapter 11 should be available only to firms seeking
to reduce scale and return to a sound core business. But this would make sense only if
judges can identify “overexpansion cases” at relatively low cost. It seems unlikely that
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judges could do this any faster than they identify, under current law, cases that should
be dismissed or converted to Chapter 7 (they typically do this within three months in
the Northern District). More data is needed—about the social benefit of Chapter 11 in
overexpansion cases, about the social costs of the Code in other cases—before we can
identify any implications for public policy.

Conclusion
The academic and political debates about small business bankruptcy need to
change. Instead of viewing Chapter 11 as a tool for rehabilitating corporations, it should
be viewed as a policy that either helps or hinders the career trajectories of small‐
business entrepreneurs. The focus should be on the small entrepreneurs themselves, not
the businesses they happen to be running at the time the Chapter 11 petition is filed.
The law should help small entrepreneurs find the optimal match between their skills
and a business strategy, but Chapter 11 is not doing this. In contrast to government‐
subsidized loans or tax subsidies, Chapter 11 instead provides a subsidy only to those
entrepreneurs willing to stay locked into their old firms.
Chapter 11 may bring some social benefits. It may reduce transaction costs in the
few cases where lock‐in is an optimal strategy (as in cases of overexpansion). The
owner‐operator may be able to reduce scale more cheaply in Chapter 11 than by starting
over again. Chapter 11 may also have beneficial effects outside of the courtroom; the
“shadow” of the law may have beneficial effects on out‐of‐court bargaining between the
debtor and its creditors. These benefits, however, are hard to assess. For those anxious
to promote small entrepreneurs or improve the operation of our bankruptcy laws, a re‐
assessment of Chapter 11 is long overdue.
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